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Abstract

THE INFLUENCE OF HORIZONTAL EQUITY, SELF EFFICACY, AND ETHICAL
POSITION ONE THE CREATION OF BUDGETARY SLACK
By Ira A. Abdullah, Ph.D.
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in Business at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2013.
Chair: Dr. Benson Wier, Professor
Department of Accounting
Virginia Commonwealth University

Co Chair: Dr. Alisa G. Brink, Assistant Professor
Department of Accounting
Virginia Commonwealth University

The budgeting process plays an important role in organizations’ planning and controlling
functions. Managers often have incentives to misreport their private information and inaccurately
set budget targets so that they are easily achievable. Such inaccuracy in budget targets is referred
to as budgetary slack. Prior research documents that managers’ decisions to create budgetary
slack are influenced by both preferences for wealth and non-pecuniary motivations. The
objective of this study is to provide a better understanding of how social preferences such as
preferences for horizontal equity, self efficacy perceptions, and ethical position influence
managers’ budgetary slack creation. The results reveal a significant interaction between
horizontal equity (equal and unequal compensation relative to a peer) and self efficacy (poor and

viii
good prior performance) on the intention to create budgetary slack. Further, this research
provides evidence regarding the impact of ethical position in the relations among perceived
fairness, self efficacy, and budgetary slack creation.
Key words: Budgetary slack, Horizontal equity, Self efficacy, Ethical position

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The consequences of unethical behavior pose significant threats for organizations.
Therefore, an emergent body of research examines potential motives that influence unethical
misconduct. Consistent with agency theory, prior studies assert that self-interested preferences
for wealth are a key reason that individuals engage in unethical behavior (Baiman, 1982; 1990;
Eisenhardt, 1989). However, other research suggests that non-pecuniary motives also influence
individuals’ behavior in economically significant ways (Douglas and Wier, 2000; Evans,
Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser, 2001; Hannan, 2005; Hartmann and Maas, 2010; Matuszewski,
2010; Merchant, 1985; Sridhar, 1994; Stevens, 2002; Young, 1985). Luft (1997) and Sprinkle
(2003) describe the importance of understanding the effects of social preferences on individuals’
judgment and decision making and call for additional research in this area. The present study
seeks to answer this call for research by examining several non-pecuniary motivational factors
which are expected to influence managers’ judgment and decision making in participative
budgeting settings. Specifically, this study investigates the impact of horizontal equity in peer
compensation, perceptions of self efficacy, and ethical position on managers’ decisions to create
budgetary slack.
The results of this study should be of interest to stakeholders of organizations. Budgets
serve an important role in organizational planning and control. They are used for resource
allocation decisions, target setting, and subordinates’ performance evaluations. Thus, there are
incentives for subordinates to engage in unethical misconduct in budgeting settings (i.e. to create
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budgetary slack). Sprinkle (2003) defines budgetary slack as an ethical issue which is present
when a subordinate intentionally chooses to misreport their actual information to the superior.
The 2008-2009 KPMG Organizational Integrity Survey reports that the prevalence of unethical
behavior within organizations is considerably high. Of the employees surveyed, 74 percent
reported observing unethical misconduct within their organizations. In addition, 46 percent of
employees reported that the nature of the misconduct was severe and could potentially harm the
public trust of their organization. Two of the most commonly observed forms of misconduct
were wasting or mismanaging organizations’ resources and mishandling private information.
These two forms of misconduct are present in the creation of budgetary slack.
Prior research indicates that a preference for fairness is an important non-pecuniary
motivational factor that can impact managers’ decisions to engage in misconduct (Evans et al.,
2001; Fehr and Smith, 1999; Luft, 1997). Equity theory suggests that perceptions of the fairness
of contributions and compensations exchanged for a specific task will influence individuals’
behavior in regard to that task (Adams, 1963). The term “horizontal equity” refers to a situation
in which an individual perceives that he or she is treated equally or fairly relative to other peers
who have the same responsibility. Prior studies indicate that perceptions of fairness related to
horizontal equity can significantly affect individuals’ ethical behavior (Kim, Evans, and Moser,
2005; Matuszewski, 2010; Moser, Evans, and Kim, 1995).
A manager’s comparisons of his or her own compensation structure relative to peers’
compensation structures can strongly influence perceptions of horizontal equity. Companies may
have valid reasons to create inequities in compensation structures across departments, divisions
or employees. Unequal compensation systems among peers may be unavoidable in order to
fulfill specific employment or projects terms. An unintended consequence of such differences
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may be employee feelings of horizontal inequity. Hollinger (1991) suggests that unequal
compensation systems are a significant predictor of deviant and counterproductive behaviors.
Matuszewski (2001) finds evidence that horizontal equity in compensation and shifts in the
levels of horizontal equity are positively related to the degree of managerial honesty in budgeting
settings. In an extension of this research, the present study investigates the effects of preferences
for fairness on managers’ ethical judgment and decision making by focusing on the impact of
horizontal equity preferences. Based on equity theory and prior literature I hypothesize that
horizontal equity influences the extent to which a manager will create budgetary slack.
A second non-pecuniary motivational factor of interest in this study is self efficacy.
Bandura (1995) defines self efficacy as individuals’ belief in their ability to perform a specific
task. Individuals will be more likely to engage in, and put effort toward, tasks that they believe
they are capable of completing. However, when self efficacy is low, individuals may not feel that
their effort will result in the successful performance of a task and may look for alternative ways
to obtain their desired outcomes. Thus, self efficacy will influence the extent of individuals’
decisions to engage in unethical misconduct in order to achieve a desired outcome (Dunn and
Schweitzer, 2005). Prior research uses information related to one’s prior performance as an
effective source of self efficacy perceptions (Bandura, 1995; Lindenmeier, 2008; Whyte, Saks,
and Hook, 1997). The current study addresses a gap in the participative budgeting literature by
examining the effect of prior performance as a source for self efficacy on budgetary slack
creation. Based on self-efficacy theory, I argue that, in general, higher self efficacy lead to less
budgetary slack creation. However, I also assert that self efficacy perceptions interact with
perceptions of horizontal equity such that individuals with high self efficacy will view horizontal

3

inequity as more unfair than individuals with low self efficacy and will therefore be more likely
to engage in budgetary slack creation.
The final motivational factor of interest in this study is ethical position. Forsyth’s ethical
ideology theory (1980) suggests that individuals take particular stances regarding ethics based on
two factors, relativism and idealism. The theory suggests that individuals’ ethical position will
affect their moral judgments and behaviors. Douglas and Wier (2000) find a positive association
between budgetary slack and relativism whereas they find a negative association between
idealism and budgetary slack creation. The current study extends prior research by examining
whether ethical position modifies the influence of horizontal equity and self efficacy on
managers’ creation of budgetary slack.
In summary, this study addresses the following primary research questions: (1) Does
horizontal equity influence budgetary slack decisions? (2) Does self efficacy influence budgetary
slack decisions? (3) Does self efficacy interact with perceptions of fairness arising from
horizontal equity in influencing budgetary slack decisions? (4) Does ethical position modify the
influence of horizontal equity and self efficacy on an individual’s decision to create budgetary
slack?
A 2x2 between subjects experiment using graduate students as participants was
conducted to test the hypotheses and answer the study’s research questions. Participants are
provided with a hypothetical case in which they are asked to assume the role of a division
manager who is responsible for setting budgeted production costs. As manager, they received
private information related to their expected costs. While the company desires managers to set
their budgets based on their best expectation of actual costs, a manager can profit from
misrepresenting their private information. Horizontal equity of compensation structure was
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manipulated between subjects by describing a peer’s compensation as either equal to or more
favorable than the participant’s compensation structure. Self efficacy was manipulated between
subjects by a description of the manager’s prior performance in setting budgets accurately (poor
prior performance or good prior performance). After reading the case, participants were asked to
make their decision regarding the budget they will report to the firm. The primary dependent
variable of interest, budgetary slack, measured as the difference between their private
information of estimated actual costs and their reported budgeted costs. Participants also
responded to manipulation check questions, several additional questions about their perceptions
of various aspects of the case, an ethical position questionnaire, and demographic questions.
This study contributes to the literature by examining how social motives, such as
perceived fairness and self efficacy, influence the decision to create budgetary slack. The results
of this study should be of interest to academics and stakeholders of organizations for several
reasons. First, the results of this study provide information regarding the extent to which
individuals are willing to sacrifice wealth due to non-pecuniary motives such as preferences for
fairness. Second, this study examines the unintended consequences of prior performance
feedback. The results reveal that such feedback can define perceptions of self efficacy which
may lead to a higher propensity for unethical behavior. Third, prior research has documented an
association between budgetary slack and ethical position (Douglas and Wier, 2000). The current
study seeks to add to our knowledge of this association by examining ethical position as a
moderator given the joint effects of horizontal equity and self efficacy. Further, the present study
answers calls for research investigating the effects of social preferences on individuals’ judgment
and decision making (Luft, 1997; Sprinkle, 2003) and research on participative budgeting
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settings examining factors related to multiple subordinate settings (Brink, Coats, and Rankin,
2012).
The results from the hypotheses tests indicate no significant main effect of horizontal equity
and self efficacy to the budgetary slack creation behavior. However, the findings affirm a
significant interaction between horizontal equity and self efficacy to the intention on creating
budget slack. Specifically, under horizontal inequity, the likelihood of deviating from the
forecast is greater when self efficacy is high than when self efficacy is low. The analyses specify
the relation between the ethical position and the decision to create slack. Particularly, the
budgetary slack creation has a negative association with idealism and positive association with
relativism. Further, the findings show that gender is a significant covariate for budgetary slack
creation decision where men are significantly more likely to create slack than women.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant
literature on budgetary slack, horizontal equity, self efficacy and ethical position. This chapter
elaborates the theoretical basis for the hypotheses development. Chapter 3 describes the research
methodology and the research instrument. Chapter 4 elaborates the analyses and reports the
results from hypotheses tests. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the contributions, implications,
limitations of the study, and potential topics for future research.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES

Budgetary Slack
Budgets serve many important roles as organizational planning and controlling tools.
They are used for target setting, resource allocation decisions, and as a common method for
evaluating subordinates’ performance. In participative budget settings, a subordinate (i.e., an
agent) is given some responsibility for setting the budget (Lindquist, 1995; Waller, 1988; Young,
1985). According to agency theory, in such settings there is often information asymmetry
between the principal (i.e., the superior) and the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The
existence of information asymmetry gives the subordinate exposure to private information that is
not available to the superior. Therefore, subordinates have the opportunity to misrepresent their
private information. As budgets are used in a variety of ways, a subordinate may have incentives
to set the budget opportunistically through the creation of budgetary slack.
Budgetary slack is the difference between the subordinate’s actual information and what
the subordinate chooses to reveal to the superior (Sprinkle, 2003). For example, subordinates
may claim more resources than their private information indicates are necessary to achieve the
desired outcome (Cyert and March, 1963). Budgetary slack could also occur if a subordinate
intentionally provides a biased budgetary target in order to increase the likelihood of achieving
the budget goal. For example, a subordinate’s private information may indicate that a certain
level of output is attainable. However, the subordinate may set the budgeted target at a lower
output level to ensure that the target is met. Prior research consistently documents the existence
of slack creation in practice (Cyert and March, 1963; Dunk and Parera, 1997; Onsi, 1973;
7

Merchant, 1985; Merchant and Manzoni, 1989; Van der Stede, 2000). Onsi (1973) conducted an
interview with 32 managers and found 80 percent of the managers admitted to budgetary slack
creation under favorable and unfavorable business conditions. Firms recognize that the creation
of budgetary slack is a common practice and may even serve a purpose. Merchant and Manzoni
(1989) find evidence that firms increase managers’ discretion to build slack in order to encounter
unexpected changes in operational cycle, encourage coordination, motivation, innovation, and
induce creative thinking. Dunk and Parera’s (1997, p. 658) field study documents a manager who
claims that it would be “inhuman if I did not build in some slack.”
Slack is considered to be “a multifaceted construct that embodies both negative and
positive connotations [for the organization]” (Sprinkle, 2003, p. 291). At times, budgetary slack
will lead to favorable outcomes. For example, slack may permit subordinates the resources and
flexibility to engage in research and development innovations (Merchant and Manzoni, 1989).
Cyert and March (1963) propose that slack absorbs prospective uncertainty in the firm’s
environment. Van der Stede (2000, p. 619) observes that firms with differentiation competitive
strategy1 utilize flexible budgetary control and “by doing so, indirectly mandate more slack.”
This is consistent with the use of budgetary slack to facilitate innovation development. In
addition, research indicates that budgetary slack is positively associated with business unit
growth (Indjejikian and Matejka, 2006) and firms’ prior performance (Van der Stede, 2000).
However, budgetary slack can also be detrimental to the organization. For instance, slack can
lead to inefficient resource allocation, ineffective budgeting functions and deceptive performance
measurement. Onsi (1973) argues that the existence of budgetary slack will lead to a less

1

Porter (1980) defines differentiation competitive strategy as a firm strategy which focuses on innovation processes
and emphasizes superior product features, brand image and customer service.
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optimal firm profit due to the costs of overestimation. In addition, Stevens (2002) observes that
budgetary slack is negatively associated with reputation and ethical concerns.
Motivations for the Creation of Budgetary Slack
Often, managers create slack in a manner consistent with their economic self interest. For
example, slack may be created to improve their performance evaluations so that they can
maintain or increase their compensation. Agency theory is often used in research to explain why
individuals engage in self-interested opportunistic behavior (Baiman, 1982; 1990; Eisenhardt,
1989). Traditional agency theory assumes that individuals only utilize wealth preference in their
decision making function. When a subordinate has both access to private information and the
opportunity to obscure it from the organization, agency theory predicts that self interest will
motivate the subordinate to engage in slack-building to maximize wealth.
While agency theory suggests that self interest is a primary motivation for subordinates’
creation of budgetary slack, prior research also documents additional factors that contribute to
the creation of budgetary slack. Such factors include the existence of information asymmetry and
risk preferences (Young, 1985), the extent of individuals’ involvement in the budgeting process
(Hartmaan and Maas, 2010; Merchant, 1985; Young, 1985), the level at which budgeting
decisions are made (Kohlmeyer and Hunton, 2004), the type of pay scheme (Waller, 1998), the
concern for reputation and variance investigation (Webb, 2002), and the type of performance
feedback (Young, Fisher, and Lindquist, 1993). This stream of research indicates that self
interest, social preferences, and values interact to influence decision making behavior associated
with budgetary practices.
Luft (1997) and Sprinkle (2003) highlight the importance of investigating the impact of
non-pecuniary motivations, such as social motivations, on managers’ judgment and decision
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making in managerial accounting settings. They suggest that social motives will help to explain
the discrepancy between theoretical predictions based on economic self interest and observed
behavior. For example, economic self interest is not consistent with an individual willingly
ignoring a chance to maximize wealth. A seminal participative budgeting study that
demonstrates the existence of non pecuniary motivations is Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser
(2001).
Evans et al. (2001) examine how managers’ preferences for honesty affect managerial
reporting decisions. Their experiment provides participants with actual costs and requires them
to submit a target cost for multiple periods. The participants are compensated based on the
difference between the target and the actual cost such that they keep the surplus funds if actual
costs are lower than targeted costs. As participants know the actual costs with certainty, their
compensation increases with certainty if they set the target cost higher than the actual cost.
Economic self interest predicts that participants will maximize their wealth by claiming the
highest payoff available (i.e., by setting the target at the highest possible amount allowed every
period). However, Evans et al. (2001) find that on average participants willingly forgo maximum
payoffs. In fact, 25 percent of the participants chose not to misreport the cost target at all.
Therefore, Evans et al. (2001) provide evidence that individuals often sacrifice wealth in order to
create an honest managerial report.
Other studies also indicate that individuals’ decisions related to budgets incorporate
preferences other than wealth maximization, such as reciprocity (Hannan, 2005), trust and
reputation (Sridhar, 1994; Stevens, 2002), personality characteristics (Hartmann and Maas,
2010), and ethical ideology (Douglas and Wier, 2000). Studies such as these that investigate how
social motives influence managerial accounting decisions can yield extensive details on when,
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why and how social preferences impact managerial accounting conflict (Sprinkle, 2003).
Ultimately, including social motives in research will generate alternative explanations and
solutions to improve the design of managerial accounting practice (Luft, 1997). The present
study extends this research by examining the relation between budgetary slack and two social
motives: equity and self efficacy preferences.
Equity
Organizational justice literature identifies three forms of justice related to perceived
equity or fairness: procedural justice, interactional justice, and distributive justice (Greenberg,
1987; Starlicki and Folger, 1997).2 Procedural justice is related to the degree of fairness in the
process used to determine an outcome. For example, when budget targets are used for
performance evaluations subordinates’ perceptions of the fairness of a company’s budgeting
process would influence their perceptions of procedural justice. Interactional justice refers to
subordinates’ perceptions of how fair the interactions are between individuals involved in a
process. For instance, subordinates’ judgment of the fairness of the way they are treated by
superiors is a measure of interactional justice. Distributive justice is related to how individuals
view the fairness of the distribution of an outcome. For example, employees’ perceptions of the
fairness of their pay relative to other employees’ pay is a measure of distributive justice. This
study is primarily interested in the impact of perceived equity of relative pay on subordinate
behavior in budgetary slack settings. Thus, distributive justice is the most relevant form of
perceived equity for the current study.

2

In this study the terms “equity,” “fairness,” and “justice” are considered to have the same underlying definition and
are used interchangeably. Specifically, these terms refer to the state, quality, or ideal of being just, impartial, and
fair.
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Equity theory
Equity theory, also often referred to as inequity theory, was first proposed by J. S. Adams
in 1963. Equity theory describes the process of how an individual will react based on his
perceptions of the equity of the contributions and rewards exchanged for a specific job or
assignment. This theory can be broken down to three propositions (Huseman, Hatfield, and
Miles, 1987). First, individuals desire to maintain an equitable or balanced exchange between the
inputs (contributions) that they provide to the job and the outcomes (rewards) that they receive
from the job. Inputs in this context consist of employees’ characteristics, such as age and
ethnicity; professional qualities, such as employees’ devoted time to the job, performance, effort,
expertise, qualifications, experience; and intangible interpersonal qualities, such as drive, loyalty,
tolerance, determination, enthusiasm, ambition, and other interpersonal skills. Outcomes include
monetary rewards, such as salary, bonus, perks and benefits; and non monetary rewards, such as
recognition, reputation, responsibility, written and verbal appreciation, job security, flexible
work arrangements and opportunity for growth. An attribute can be considered an input or
outcome as long as the employee perceives it to be relevant to the exchange (Adams, 1963).
Therefore, each individual may have different attributes that constitute their perception of inputs
and outcomes exchanged.
The second proposition of equity theory suggests that individuals will compare their
inputs and outcomes exchanged against a reference person or group to determine whether they
are treated equally or not (Huseman et al., 1987).3 The reference person or groups range from
colleagues, peers, and superiors, to family members and relatives. Individuals will view they are
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The comparative process between an individual and his reference is aligned with social comparison processes
theory as described by Festinger (1954). Social comparison theory states that individuals have the drive to compare
themselves to others to evaluate and validate their opinions and or abilities. Furthermore, Homans (1961) asserts that
individuals will compare their state to others’ to evaluate the existence of distributive justice.
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in an equitable state if they perceive that they receive equal outcomes as an exchange for their
inputs relative to their reference person or groups. Further, an inequitable state is present if
individuals perceive that their inputs and outcomes exchanged are not equal.
The final proposition of equity theory specifies that inequity in rewards will create a
negative state that will motivate behavioral changes designed to negate inequity (Huseman et al.,
1987). For an over-rewarded situation, the negative state includes guilt and fear of retaliation. On
the other hand, under-rewarded individuals will experience emotional distress. Moreover,
individuals who receive an unequal reward are less content and satisfied compared to those who
receive an equal reward (Austin and Walster, 1974; Walster, Berscheid, and Walster, 1973). In
addition, Hollinger (1991) suggests that rewards perceived to be unequal are a significant
predictor of deviant behaviors such as theft and other counterproductive acts. Individuals
committing deviant behaviors often intend to restore the state of equality. A meta-analytic
review by Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, and Ng (2001) provides further evidence that
perceived inequity may result in a variety of negative reactions to restore equity. These negative
reactions include reducing effort, negotiating rewards, theft, and decisions to transfer to another
division or leave the firm (Greenberg, 1990; Hollinger and Clark, 1983; Skarlicki and Folger,
1997).
Equity preferences and economic self-interest
Preferences for, or perceptions of, equity or fairness of relative pay preferences may
interact with economic self interest to affect behavior. Fehr and Smith (1999) investigate settings
where economic self interest and preferences for equity can conflict. Their results suggest that
the economic context or environment influences which motive will be dominant. Equity
preferences are found to dominate in ultimatum games, gift exchange games, and public goods
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games with punishment settings, while economic self interest dominates in market games and
public goods games without punishment. These results indicate that individuals are inclined to
sacrifice material payoffs in exchange for more equitable outcomes in some settings.
Luft (1997) calls for research investigating the influence of economic self interest and
equity motives on behavior in managerial accounting settings. She posits that investigating
equity preferences will increase the ability to explain management accounting practice. Cohen,
Holder-Webb, Sharp, and Pant (2007) find evidence consistent with this assertion. They examine
the influence of fairness on individuals’ stated intentions to engage in opportunistic action in cost
reporting settings. Their experiment analyzes 233 managers’ stated intentions to allocate research
and development costs to either a nearly complete project or to a future project. The choice to
allocate these costs to a future project is an opportunistic action in the experiment. The results
show that perceived fairness is a significant determinant of individuals’ stated intention to
engage in the opportunistic action.4 In other words, if participants perceive an action to be fair or
to lead to a fair outcome, they are more likely to engage in that action. Further, sensitivity
analyses indicate that intentions to act opportunistically are not affected by the magnitude of the
rewards. Rather, if individuals perceived the outcome from misallocating the cost as fair, they
will engage in that action regardless of the magnitude of the reward. Thus, Cohen et al. (2007)
affirm that self interest is not the only motive dictating individuals’ behavior. Furthermore, this
study indicates that perceived equity can alter and influence individuals’ decision-making
processes.

4

Cohen et al. (2007) measure the perceptions of outcome fairness based on participant responses to three moral
equity items of the Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) developed by Reidenbach and Robin (1990). The three
equity scales, using seven point Likert scale, measure how fair, how just, and how morally right participants
perceive the cost allocation action described in the case to be.
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Equity preferences and budgetary slack
Evans et al. (2001) conducted three experiments to observe how managers’ preferences
for wealth and honesty affect managerial reporting decisions. In addition to the results discussed
in a previous section, they also found that reporting honesty varies based on the distribution of
payoffs between the subordinate and the firm. Honesty is higher when managers receive a higher
share of profits than when managers receive a lower share of profits. This result is consistent
with equity theory as it suggests individuals perceived a certain distribution of profit to be a fair
exchange. Thus, the reported level of honesty is influenced by individuals’ reactions to the
perceived fairness of the payoff distribution.
Several additional studies investigate the influence of equity preferences on budgeting
settings (Libby, 2001; 2003; Lindquist, 1995; Little, Magner, and Welker, 2002; Staley and
Magner, 2007; Wentzel, 2002; 2004). Evidence from this literature suggests that when managers
perceive budgetary procedures to be fair they demonstrate a low propensity to create budgetary
slack, high job performance, and high organizational citizenship behavior (Little et al., 2002).
Libby (2003) investigates the association between compensation contracts and the creation of
budgetary slack. Her results indicate that participants who perceive their compensation
contracting process to be fair create less budgetary slack than those who perceive their
compensation contracting process to be unfair. In a participative budgeting setting with
asymmetric information, Wentzel (2004) examines whether fairness or equity preferences
moderate the creation of budgetary slack. In general, her results indicate that budgeting practices
that are perceived to be fair result in less budgetary slack.
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Horizontal equity and budgetary slack
The present study extends the prior research investigating the effects of equity
preferences on the creation of budgetary slack by focusing on the impact of horizontal equity
preferences. The term “horizontal equity” is used to illustrate fair treatment among colleagues or
peers and “horizontal inequity” refers to a situation where an individual perceives that he or she
is treated inequitably relative to other peers or colleagues with the same responsibility (Kim,
Evans, and Moser, 2005; Matuszewski, 2010; Moser, Evans, and Kim, 1995). Thus, an
investigation of the impact of horizontal equity on decision making means that the experimental
participant can make comparisons between themselves and a referent peer. Most prior
experimental research on participative budgeting focuses on situations involving a single
superior/subordinate pair where the subordinate has no information about other peer subordinates
(Brink, Coats, and Rankin, 2012). However, subordinates faced with budgeting decisions in
practice will often have some information regarding their peers, whether it is in the form of
inputs (e.g., peer compensation levels, treatment of peers by superiors, peer working conditions,
etc.) or peer outputs (e.g., peer choices, behaviors, reputation, productivity levels, etc.). Thus,
Brink et al. (2012) call for additional research investigating participative budgeting settings with
multiple subordinates. The current study answers that call for research.
In addition, as the previous section illustrates, prior research investigating the impact of
equity preferences in managerial accounting settings tends to focus on forms of equity other than
horizontal equity, such as the fairness of the contracting process (Libby, 2003; Wentzel, 2004) or
distribution of pay between the superior and subordinate (Evans et al., 2001). In areas other than
budgeting, however, accounting research finds that horizontal equity concerns have a significant
impact on behavior (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Ghosh, 2000; Kachelmeier and Towry, 2002; Kim
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et al., 2005; Luft and Libby, 1997; Moser et al., 1995). Kim et al. (2005) and Moser et al. (1995)
find that taxpayers’ decisions to report taxable income honestly are impacted by economic
effects and perceptions of horizontal equity. Luft and Libby (1997) affirm that experienced
managers’ perceptions of horizontal equity on the relative profit distribution influenced
negotiated transfer prices.
Only one study, Matuszewski (2010), directly investigates the impact of horizontal equity
in a budgeting setting. She examines whether a manager’s honesty in budgetary reporting is
influenced by changes in horizontal equity between his own and a peer’s salary. In her
experiment, participants assume the role of department manager engaged in a multi-period
participative budgeting task. Matuszewski’s participants submit a cost target after they receive
private information regarding the actual costs, their compensation structure, and their peer’s
compensation structure. Participants were able to retain the difference between the actual cost
and the reported cost target, creating an incentive to misreport the cost target. The dependent
variable is degree of honesty of the reported cost target. Matuszewski’s experiment manipulates
changes in horizontal equity (no changes, increased, or decreased) and shifts in relative salary
levels (equal, peer’s salary is higher, and peer’s salary is lower). Her results suggest that honesty
increases when shifts in relative salary levels result in a restoration of equity or increase
horizontal equity. Further, the increase in honesty is greater when horizontal equity is achieved
by increasing the manager’s salary so that it is equal to the peer’s salary as compared to
treatments where horizontal equity is restored through a decrease in the peer’s salary. In
summary, Matuszewski (2001) finds evidence indicating that changes in horizontal equity in the
reward system are positively associated with changes in the degree of honesty in budgeting
settings.
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In summary, equity theory and prior literature suggest that individuals’ preferences for
equity will influence their choices in budgetary settings. Specifically, when individuals
experience horizontal equity they will demonstrate higher honesty resulting in less budgetary
slack than when they experience horizontal inequity. This leads to the first hypothesis:
H1: Individuals with horizontal equity in compensation will create less budgetary slack
than those with horizontal inequity in compensation.

Self Efficacy
Albert Bandura (1995, p. 2) defined self efficacy as “the belief in one’s capabilities to
organize and execute the courses of action required to manage prospective situations.” Thus, self
efficacy theory relates to an individual’s belief regarding whether he or she has the ability to
execute or perform a specific act. Self efficacy theory suggests this belief will affect performance
both directly and indirectly.
Empirical studies on the effects of perceived self efficacy have been conducted in various
research settings. For example, self efficacy influences the decision to volunteer (Lindenmeier,
2008), escalation of commitment decisions (Whyte, Saks, and Hook, 1997), personal and
academic goals and performance (Lee, Locke, and Phan, 1997; Wood and Locke, 1987;
Zimmerman, Bandura, and Martinez-Pons, 1992), goal orientation (Brown, Cron, and Slocum,
1998; Cumming and Hall, 2004), the ability to adapt to new technology (Hill, Smith, and Mann,
1987), career choices (Lent, Brown, and Hackett, 1994). A meta-analytic review by Stajkovic
and Luthans (1998) concludes that self efficacy is positively and significantly related to task
performance.
Self efficacy differs from self esteem. Self efficacy relates to an individual’s view of his
or her personal capability on a specific task. Whereas, self esteem describes an individual’s
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exhaustive evaluation of his or her own self worth (Bandura, 1997). Hence, the distinction
between self efficacy and self esteem lies in the scope of the evaluation. Self esteem is an overall
evaluation of one’s self while self efficacy is a task specific evaluation. Bandura (1997)
describes three self efficacy dimensions that determine the self efficacy associated with each
task. First, efficacy depends on the level of magnitude of task difficulty that individuals believe
they can overcome. Second, strength relates to how convinced one is in their magnitude beliefs.
Third, efficacy differs in generality or the degree to which expectations can be extended to other
situations (Gist, 1987). These dimensions establish a distinct perception of efficacy for each task.
Bandura (1977) also contrasts self efficacy and outcome expectation. Outcome
expectation is an individual’s estimation that a certain outcome will result from a given behavior.
Self efficacy is “the conviction that one can successfully execute the behavior required to
produce [that] outcome” (Bandura, 1977, p.193). Outcome expectation and perceived efficacy
are both determinants of behavior, and both must be present to encourage a desired behavior.
Therefore the present study incorporates both self efficacy, using past performance information,
and outcome expectation through reward information.5
Information sources influencing self efficacy perceptions
For a given task, individuals may base self efficacy perceptions on four sources of
information: (1) mastery experiences, (2) vicarious experiences, (3) verbal persuasion, and (4)
psychological and emotional states (Bandura, 1977; 1995). The most influential source of
information in developing efficacy perceptions is mastery experiences. Such experiences include
one’s prior performance or accomplishments in similar situation (Bandura, 1982; Bandura,
Adams, and Beyer, 1977; Lindenmeier, 2008; Whyte et al., 1997). Prior successes in performing

5

The focus of this study is how differences in self efficacy influence behavior. Thus, in the experiment self efficacy
is manipulated (high and low) while outcome expectation is held constant across treatments.
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a specific task will strengthen individual self efficacy, which contributes to the expectation that
future performance will also be successful. In contrast, prior failures will weaken self efficacy,
which contributes to the expectation of unsuccessful future performance.
A second source of information contributing to perceived self efficacy is vicarious
experience. Such experiences are based on the observation of others’ performance in similar
situations. Observing others’ successes will influence individuals to believe that they also have
the ability to accomplish a similar task. On the other hand, others’ failures related to a task will
dampen one’s self efficacy and motivation in regard to a similar task (Bandura, 1995; Jacobs,
Prentice-Dunn and Rogers, 1984; Stanley and Maddux, 1986).
The third source of information influencing self efficacy is verbal or social persuasions
received from others. Persuasion can take the form of information from others that provides
assurance that one has the capability to perform and master a task. Such persuasion can come
from performance feedback or verbal encouragement. Individuals who receive positive
persuasion are likely to form strong efficacy beliefs that remove their self doubt about their
ability to perform the task successfully and will exert effort toward the task (Block and Keller,
1995; Lindenmeier, 2008)
The final source of self efficacy information includes psychological and emotional states.
Emotional states such as anxiety, stress, arousal, and other moods, may influence individuals’
perceptions of self efficacy in a positive or negative direction (Bodin and Martinsen, 2004;
Kavanagh and Bower, 1985).
The impact of self efficacy on behavior
Perceived self efficacy plays an important role on individuals’ behavior. Self efficacy
affects how individuals assess their ability and influences the actions that they will take in a
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situation. Individuals will perform tasks that they believe they are capable of completing.
However, if they believe that they are incompetent in a certain area; they will avoid tasks related
to that area.
Zimmerman et al. (1992) examine the causal role of students’ self efficacy and academic
goals in self-motivated academic settings. Based on path analysis procedures, the study confirms
that students’ belief in their efficacy for self regulated learning influences their perception of
their ability to attain academic achievements. Self efficacy influenced their perceived personal
academic goals and their actual academic accomplishments. The findings from Zimmerman et al.
(1992) indicate that self efficacy perceptions are important determinants of goals that will be set
for a specific task and subsequent performance related to these goals.
Efficacy beliefs also affect individuals’ effort and persistence related to specific tasks.
Positive self efficacy encourages strong interest and commitment, more challenging goals, and
high persistence of effort toward a task (Pajares, 2002). In an experimental setting, Jacobs et al.
(1984) assess how persistence is affected by self efficacy, outcome expectation, and self
awareness. Of these three variables, results indicate that self efficacy is the best predictor of
persistence. Individuals with strong self efficacy perceptions view a task as a challenge to be
embrace instead of a threat to be avoided. Positive self efficacy will convey strong interest and
commitment, more challenging goals, and high persistence of effort in the task (Pajares, 2002).
Efficacy perceptions also impact individuals’ thought patterns and emotional reactions
related to a task (Pajares, 2002). Individuals with low self efficacy may believe that the task is
too difficult to master and leads to negative emotional states, such as anxiety, stress, or
depression. Such negative emotional states may prevent an individual from searching for the best
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approach to solve the task. Thus, emotional reactions will indirectly affect the actual degree of
success one experiences in accomplishing a task.
Self efficacy, prior performance, and budgetary slack
The present study will utilize self efficacy theory to delineate the link between
individuals’ past performance, self efficacy and future performance expectations. As was
discussed previously, mastery experiences are the most influential form of information used in
developing self efficacy perceptions. Such experiences encompass prior performance on the task
or similar tasks (Bandura, 1982; Bandura, Adams, and Beyer, 1977). Bandura (1997) affirms that
individuals base their expectations of what they can achieve in the future on their past
performance. This is especially true when individuals attribute their past successes or failures to
factors within their control, such as ability, competence, or effort. Hence, past performance
directly affects individuals’ expectations of future performance (Weiner, 1985).
Numerous studies also confirm the relation between past performance and expectations
of future performance. For example, Spieker and Hinsz (2004) investigate the role of repeated
prior successes and failures on personal goal setting. They find that participants with past
successes set their goals significantly higher than those with past failures. Webb, Jeffrey, and
Schulz (2010) find evidence suggesting that past performance is positively related to current
performance. Further, they find that employees with good prior performance were more likely to
set realistic goals than employees with poorer prior performance. Audia, Locke, and Smith
(2000) find that prior success creates satisfaction and confidence, and these traits affect
individuals’ actions and strategies for the future.
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Whyte et al. (1997) examine the role self efficacy plays in influencing individuals’
decisions to escalate commitment.6 The experimental manipulation of self efficacy in Whyte et
al. (1997) consists of descriptions of prior performance successes (high self efficacy) and failures
(low self efficacy) in prior performance. Their results indicate that self efficacy can exacerbate
individuals’ decisions to escalate commitment to a failing activity. This occurs because
individuals with high self efficacy believe in their ability to successfully perform the task and
therefore persist with the investment despite evidence indicating that the project should be
discontinued. Consequently, individuals with high self efficacy will invest more resources, exert
greater effort, and take greater risks in order to save unprofitable projects. Individuals with low
self efficacy, however, will invest fewer resources and less effort due to their belief that they lack
competence related to the task.
This literature indicates that prior successes and failures influence self efficacy. In turn,
self efficacy affects the decision making process. The current study will investigate the impact of
self efficacy on managerial decisions to create budgetary slack. As mastery expectations or prior
performance are the most influential information sources in the development of self efficacy
perceptions, I will use prior performance information to manipulate self efficacy perceptions
(Whyte et al., 1997). Specifically, in this setting, higher budgetary slack will increase the
likelihood that participants will benefit monetarily, but it will be at the expense of the company.
In contrast, the company desires managers to set budgets accurately. Thus, “good” prior
performance will be defined as a history of setting the budget target accurately (i.e., neither too
high nor too low).
6

Staw and Ross (1987, p. 39) define escalation situations as “predicaments where costs are suffered in a course of
action and subsequent activities have the potential either to reverse or compound one’s initial losses.” Escalation of
commitment occurs when one continues to invest in an unprofitable project when discontinuing investment is more
economically beneficial. Essentially, escalation reflects poor decision making as it indicates that individuals increase
investment due to sunk costs, despite evidence suggesting that the investment should be discontinued.
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Higher prior performance should contribute toward the development of high self efficacy.
In turn, high self efficacy should contribute toward individuals’ beliefs that they have the ability
to accomplish the task successfully. Specifically, individuals with high prior performance will
feel capable of setting accurate cost targets, which should motivate them to try to maintain
efficacy by setting future targets accurately. In other words, high prior performance should
decrease the likelihood that individuals will set inaccurate targets or build in budgetary slack. In
contrast, poor past performance should contribute toward individuals’ belief that they do not
have the required ability to master the task. Thus, as compared to individuals with high self
efficacy, individuals with low self efficacy will be more likely to create budgetary slack. This
leads to the following hypothesis:
H2: Individuals with good prior performance will create less budgetary slack than those
with poor prior performance.

The Interaction of Horizontal Equity and Self Efficacy on Budgetary Slack Creation
Hypothesis 1 predicts that horizontal inequity in compensation will increase individuals’
propensity to create budgetary slack. Hypothesis 2 draws from efficacy theory to predict that
individuals with low self efficacy will be more likely to create slack than individuals with high
self efficacy. However, there is reason to predict that perceptions of horizontal equity and self
efficacy will interact to influence behavior, such that the main effect of efficacy is modified in
the presence of horizontal inequity.
Specifically, ignoring equity concerns, self efficacy theory predicts that individuals with
high efficacy will be less likely to create slack due to their confidence in their ability to achieve a
high level of performance. Individuals with high self efficacy view themselves as capable. When
horizontal equity considerations are introduced, they are likely to be evaluated in reference to
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one’s perceptions of efficacy. When there is horizontal inequity such that high efficacy
individuals’ compensation is lower than peer compensation, high efficacy individuals are likely
to feel that such inequity is unjustified and unfair. Thus, when faced with horizontal inequity,
high efficacy individuals are likely to have a negative reaction. Recall that self efficacy theory
indicates that emotional states related to efficacy perceptions also play a role in determining
behavior in response to a task (Pajares, 2002). Further, equity theory indicates that individuals
often respond to perceived inequity with negative actions intended to restore equity (Hollinger,
1991). In the budgetary slack setting, slack creation is not the desired action from the perspective
of the firm. Thus, slack creation is a tool that individuals can use to retaliate for perceived
inequity. Therefore, horizontal inequity should increase the likelihood that high self efficacy
individuals will create budgetary slack. This leads to the following hypothesized interaction:
H3: Good prior performance will decrease budgetary slack creation when there is
horizontal equity relative to when there is horizontal inequity.

Ethical Ideology
Individuals often differ in perceptions of whether certain practices are ethical or unethical
(Schlenker and Forsyth, 1977). Forsyth (1980, p. 183) proposes a typology of ethical ideology to
explain variation between individuals’ moral judgments based on the assertion that “ in general
people take particular stances regarding ethics and that the position taken will influence the
judgment reached.” In Forsyth’s typology, individuals’ ethical position is based on two factors,
relativism and idealism.
According to Forsyth (1980), relativism relates to the extent one relies on universal moral
principles or rules to direct the correct response to ethical issues. Individuals with high relativism
reject the idea of relying on universal rules. Rather, the individuals with high relativism believe
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that there are alternative perspectives that can be espoused to reach moral judgment. In other
words, individuals high in relativism feel that the correct moral response is context specific.
Hence, rather than using a universal rule for every ethical issue, a high relativist will analyze
each issue to determine which rule to assume for solving each situation. In contrast, a low
relativist believes in the validity of universal rules and believes that such rules should be applied
consistently without variation based on specific situational factors. To illustrate, an example of a
universal moral rule might be that theft is morally wrong. A high relativist would argue that
some contexts justify theft as a morally acceptable action, while a low relativist would argue that
theft is wrong in any context.
The second factor in Forsyth’s typology is idealism. Idealism relates to one’s beliefs in
the relation between moral actions and outcomes. An idealist believes that a morally correct
action always results in a positive outcome and a morally incorrect action always results in a
negative outcome. In contrast, less idealistic individuals believe that moral and immoral actions
can result in a combination of positive and negative outcomes. Idealism can also be interpreted
relative to the degree of individuals’ concern for the welfare of others (Forsyth, 1992). For
example, research and development costs may be cut to manage earnings for the period. Idealists
would view the earnings management as always resulting in a negative outcome because it
would harm others’ welfare (e.g., shareholder’s long-term wealth will be damaged). Therefore,
idealist individuals would always avoid engaging in such earnings management. In contrast, nonidealists perceive that acts may result in both positive and negative outcomes. Thus, a nonidealist may see that although shareholder’s long-term wealth may be damaged, short-term
profitability goals will be reached, which may have a positive impact on others’ welfare such as
short-term stock price increases for shareholders because analysts’ forecasts were met allowing
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employees evaluated on earnings targets to avoid negative evaluations, receive bonuses, or
possibly even retain their jobs. Thus, non-idealist individuals may engage in this form of
earnings management if they view it as necessary to achieve a desirable positive outcome.
Forsyth (1980) argues that individuals’ ethical position ranges from high to low in the
emphasis on principle (relativism) and the emphasis on consequences (idealism). Therefore,
one’s ethical position exists somewhere on the spectrum between idealistic and relativistic.
Forsyth (1980) classifies ethical positions into four types, based on the level of relativism and
idealism, which are situationism, absolutism, subjectivism, and exceptionism (see Figure 1).
Situationism refers to individuals who score high on relativism and idealism. Situationists
reject universal moral principles in ethical issues since they believe that each issue must be
analyzed individually. Situationists identify positive outcomes as the only acceptable
consequences from moral acts. If an act creates negative or mixed results for others, then the act
is immoral and needs to be avoided. Absolutism refers to individuals with low relativism and
high idealism. Absolutists acknowledge the application of universal moral principles in ethical
issues. However, like situationists, absolutists only view an act as moral and acceptable if it only
produces positive outcomes.
Subjectivism relates to ethical positions which score high on relativism and low on
idealism. A subjectivist rejects the idea of applying a universal moral principle for every ethical
issue and feels that “negative consequences do not necessarily make an action immoral”
(Barnett, Bass, and Brown, 1994, p.470). Exceptionism refers to individuals who score low on
both relativism and idealism. Exceptionists recognize that moral acts can result in both positive
and negative outcomes. Exceptionists accept the application of universal moral principles in
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analyzing ethical issues but also agree to ignore the universal rule if they consider a different rule
to be more applicable (Barnett et al., 1994).
Ethical ideology and budgetary slack creation
Previous studies document that individuals’ ethical ideology affects their judgments of
ethical and unethical business practices and determines the practices they are willing to engage in
(Barnett et al., 1994; Forsyth, 1992). For example, Arrington and Reckers (1985) document
significant relations between ethical position and non-economic judgments in tax evasion
decisions (e.g., tax evaders’ social responsibility, tax evasion seriousness, and taxpayers’
perceptions of tax compliance as a social norm). Shaub, Finn and Munter (1993) examine the
effects of auditors’ ethical ideology on ethical sensitivity and find that auditors scoring high on
relativism are less likely to recognize ethical issues in their auditing assignments. In addition,
Greenfield, Norman and Wier (2008) find that idealistic individuals are less likely to engage in
earnings management practices than relativistic individuals. Elias (2002) finds that absolutists
and situationists view earnings managements as a more severe unethical issue than exceptionists
and subjectivists.
Recall that budgetary slack occurs when subordinates intentionally choose to withhold
accurate information from their superiors (Sprinkle, 2003; Merchant, 1995; Merchant and
Manzoni, 1989). Ethical dilemmas exist in decision making processes when the outcome or
action may harm others (Velasquez and Rostankowski, 1985). Budgetary slack often poses
negative consequences for the organization (Sprinkle, 2003; Merchant, 1995). Merchant (1995,
p. 2) states that slack creation violates “role-related norms and desired virtues of professional
managers and accountants.” Therefore, the creation of budgetary slack is an ethical dilemma,
which incorporates individuals’ moral judgment (Douglas and Wier, 2000).

28

Prior studies verify that ethical ideology influences decisions to create budgetary slack.
A seminal study in this area, Douglas and Wier (2000), develops and tests a structural equation
model that uses ethical position to explain managers’ decisions in creating budgetary slack. In
addition to ethical position, the model investigates whether budgetary slack is a function of
managers’ participation in the budgeting process, the presence of information asymmetry, and
incentives to create slack. Based on responses from 688 certified managers, the results indicate
that, given the opportunity and incentives to create slack, ethical ideology is a significant
explanatory factor of budgetary slack creation. The results indicate that negative relation
between idealistic individuals and the decision to create budgetary slack. Conversely, the results
affirm positive relation between relativistic individuals and the budgetary slack creation.
Based on the association between ethical ideology and ethical dilemmas observed in
various aspect of business practice, individuals’ ethical position is expected to influence their
decision to engage in the creation of budgetary slack. Hence, ethical ideology is expected to
moderate the impact of self efficacy and horizontal equity on slack creation behavior. Further,
predictions for each of Forsyth’s (1980) four types of ethical positions are described in Figure 1
and in the following paragraphs.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
In general, high idealism and low relativism are expected to be negatively correlated with
budgetary slack creation. Therefore, absolutists (high idealism and low relativism) are expected
to create the least amount of budgetary slack relative to situationists, subjectivists, and
exceptionists. Absolutists utilize universal moral principles, which would likely rule that
opportunism and inaccuracy are wrong. In addition, absolutists would avoid acts which produce
negative outcomes, such as the negative outcomes associated with budgetary slack for the firm
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and its stakeholders. Thus, absolutists are postulated to most strongly perceive the creation of
budgetary slack to be unethical.
In contrast, subjectivists (low idealism and high relativism) are expected to create the
most amount of budgetary slack of the four types of ethical positions. Subjectivists ignore the
application of universal moral rules on ethical issues and analyze each ethical issue in a context
specific manner. Thus, subjectivists are not expected to consider budgetary slack creation as
unethical despite the negative consequences of the act.
Situationists (high idealism and high relativism) and exceptionists (low idealism and low
relativism) are expected to demonstrate some intermediate level of budgetary slack creation.
Situationists will not honor universal moral principles, but will view budgetary slack creation as
unethical due to its negative outcomes. Meanwhile, exceptionists honor universal moral
principles, but will be willing to apply alternative rules and not condemn slack creation as
immoral due to its potential for positive outcomes along with the negative outcomes.
In summary, this study predicts that subjectivists and exceptionists, who score low in
idealism, will less likely to view budgetary slack as unethical. Meanwhile, absolutists and
situationists, who score high in idealism, will be more likely to classify budgetary slack creation
as an immoral act. Consistent with Douglas and Wier (2000), the creation of budgetary slack is
positively associated with relativism and negatively associated with idealism. This leads to the
following hypotheses:
H4: Higher idealism results in lower levels of slack creation.
H5: Higher relativism results in higher levels of slack creation.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Experimental Design
The hypotheses were tested using a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment with ethical
position as an additional measured variable. The two manipulated independent variables are
horizontal equity (equal or unequal pay rate relative to a peer) and self efficacy (high or low
prior performance in budget setting accuracy). Participants are randomly assigned to one of the
four conditions. Ethical position is measured using Forsyth’s (1980) Ethical Position
Questionnaire (EPQ). The experimental instrument is provided in the Appendix.
Experimental Task
All participants received a case with identical background information describing their
role as a manager at a hypothetical manufacturing company. The case briefly describes a
company that has multiple production lines and production managers. The participants assumed
the role of a production manager who is involved in the budgeting process. In particular, one task
they are responsible for as manager is setting the target production costs that will be reported to
the company each period. The funds transferred to the production department are determined by
this target production cost set by the manager. The company expects that all production
managers to set the cost target based on their best estimation of the actual cost. The case
elaborates the negative consequences for the company if managers set the cost target too high or
too low. If the cost target is too low, then the risk of a delay in the production process will
emerge because the production line will not have sufficient funds to support the production.
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Conversely, setting the cost target too high will create inefficiency for the company due to
misallocation of funds.
The case also explains that the manager has a private forecasting system that predicts the
actual costs for the period with 75 percent accuracy (i.e., there is a 75 percent chance that the
forecast will be equal to the actual costs and a 25 percent chance that the actual costs will be
higher than the forecast). As the forecast is private, only the manager has knowledge of the
forecast. The company only knows that the range of actual production costs is between $2,000
and $6,000. Thus, the participant can choose to use the forecast as they wish when setting the
production cost target for the period.
Following the background information, participants received information regarding their
compensation structure and past performance based on their treatment. These independent
variables are described in more detail in a following section. After reading the case, participants
answered questions designed to assess their likelihood of creating budgetary slack. They then
answer manipulation check questions, additional questions to verify their understanding of the
case, and a few additional questions about their perceptions of the issues presented in the case.
Finally, they completed the ethical position questionnaire and answered a few demographic
questions, such as age, gender, current class level, current GPA, number of years of work
experience, employment status, and involvement in budgeting process.
Independent Variables
Horizontal Equity
Prior studies document several alternatives for operationalizing horizontal equity in
experimental settings (e.g., Matuszewski, 2010; Moser et al., 1995). In this study, a manager’s
compensation rate relative to a peer manager’s compensation rate will be used to operationalize
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horizontal equity. This operationalization is similar to Matuszewski (2010), which used relative
salary levels to manipulate horizontal equity. Specifically, the experimental case will inform
participants that production managers are peers and have the same gender, level of experience,
job descriptions, responsibility, and work load. The compensation structure for production
managers consists of a fixed wage and a share in the cost savings. Cost savings are defined as the
excess of targeted production costs over actual production costs.
For the horizontal equity treatment, participants are told that the fixed salary and the
share in the cost savings are the same for all production managers. The compensation equation,
which is the same for all production managers, is: 50% of cost savings (target cost - actual cost)
per production cycle + fixed wage.
In the horizontal inequity treatment, participants are told that the fixed salary is same for
all production managers. However, the proportion of cost savings is different from the other
production manager. The participants receive 50% share of their cost saving while their peers
receive 95% share of cost savings.
Self Efficacy
Bandura (1995) describes four sources of self efficacy which are (1) mastery experiences,
(2) vicarious experiences, (3) verbal persuasion, and (4) psychological and emotional states. The
most influential source of self efficacy information is mastery experiences through individual’s
prior performance or accomplishments in similar situation (Bandura, 1982; Bandura, Adams, and
Beyer, 1977). Prior studies document methods to manipulate prior performance through
information embedded in experimental task design (Lindenmeier, 2008; Whyte, Saks, and Hook,
1997).
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Consistent with Whyte et al. (1997), this study manipulates participants’ perception of
self efficacy by embedding information regarding participants’ prior performance to manage the
production department and set accurate budgets. From this information, participants are expected
to judge their capabilities in the task. This information is manipulated to provide participants
with high self efficacy or low self efficacy.
For the high self efficacy treatment, participants are provided with persuasive
encouragement signaling that they possess the required ability to manage their production line. In
high self efficacy condition, participants will read the following information:
“Despite the difficulties of reporting accurate cost targets, you have established an
excellent record for working efficiently and reporting accurate cost targets. Your prior
performance in setting accurate cost targets is derived from your exceptional ability as a
production manager. This obviously indicates that you have mastered the skills and the
knowledge required to effectively and successfully manage your production line.”
In the low self efficacy treatment, participants are informed that they did not have a good
track record of working efficiently or reporting accurate production cost targets. For this
condition the participants will receive information that their ability as a production manager is
doubtful. The following statement is provided for the low self efficacy condition:
“You have not established a record for working efficiently and reporting accurate
production cost targets. Your poor prior performance in setting accurate cost targets
makes it questionable whether your skills and knowledge are sufficient to effectively and
successfully manage your production line.”
Moderating Measured Variable – Ethical Position
The study will use the Ethical Position Questionnaire (EPQ) developed by Forsyth
(1980). This questionnaire has been used extensively in prior research to measure participants’
ethical position (e.g., Arrington and Reckers, 1985; Douglas and Wier, 2000; Elias, 2002;
Greenfield, Norman and Wier, 2008; Shaub, Finn and Munter, 1993). Davis, Andersen, and
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Curtis (2001) evaluate the construct validity of the EPQ and find that the scale shows moderately
high internal consistency. Further, Davis et al. note that the EPQ is a useful measure of ethical
position and a tool for assessing individual variations in the ethical decision making process.
The EPQ consists of 20 statements, divided into two sets of 10 statements each
measuring idealism and relativism. Participants will rate their degree of agreement or
disagreement using a 9-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 which equals “completely agree”
to 9 which equals “completely disagree.” EPQ will produce two scores, one score for idealism
and the other for relativism. Each score is derived from summing the responses from idealism or
relativism statements and divided it by 10. Following prior studies (i.e. Barnett et al., 1994;
Elias, 2002; Forsyth and Nye, 1990), this study calculated the median scores for relativism and
idealism. Further, participants’ scores were categorized into high or low relativism and idealism
relative to the median.
Manipulation and Understanding Checks
Two manipulation check questions are available to verify that the participants understand
the task and the manipulations on the instrument. The first manipulation check question relates to
the horizontal equity manipulation. It requests that participants indicate the bonus rate received
on their compensation structure. The answer options are either “less than my peer’s bonus rate”
or “equal to my peer’s bonus rate”. The second manipulation check question relates to the self
efficacy treatment. Participants will indicate, based on the prior performance information
provided in the case, whether they lack or have sufficient ability as production manager.
Participants who did not understand the manipulations are expected to fail to provide
correct answers for the manipulation checks. Thus, these participants will be excluded from the
primary analyses. However, analyses both with and without the participants that fail the
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manipulation checks will be compared to ascertain the impact on the results of omitting these
participants.
In addition to the manipulation check questions, participants were asked several questions
intended to verify their understanding of important information provided in the case. First,
participants were asked to state the level of accuracy of their private forecasting system. The next
question asks participants to indicate whether their total compensation would increase if their
cost target exceeds actual production costs. Participants provide their answer on an 11-point
Likert-type scale ranging from 0 which equals “strongly disagree” to 10 which equals “strongly
agree.”
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable of interest for this study is the likelihood of budgetary slack
creation. Participants are given a forecast of actual production costs. The budgetary slack
variable is the difference between the submitted production cost target and the forecasted
production costs. Participants were asked a series of questions to obtain information about their
intentions to create budgetary slack.
General Propensity to Deviate from the Forecast
First, participants were asked to indicate the likelihood of whether, in general, they would
report a cost target that is different than the forecasted amount. Participants responded using a
Likert-type scale with endpoints labeled “Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost
that is less than the forecast”, and “Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost that is
higher than the forecast”. The midpoint of the scale will be labeled “Will most likely report a
targeted production cost equal to the forecast”. Reponses from this question are used to test the
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impact of the independent variables on participants’ general propensity to deviate from the
forecast.
Numerical Point Estimates of Budgetary Slack
Next, participants were asked three questions about the production cost targets they
would set in response to three specific forecasts. The questions assume the forecast amount to be
$225,000, $400,000 or $575,000. As the range of possible costs is $200,000 to $600,000, these
amounts are designed to obtain responses for a low, medium, and high forecast, respectively. In
turn, these forecasts provide participants with high, medium, or low opportunity to create slack,
respectively. The task requires participants to state the amount that they will report as their
budgeted production cost in response to each of these forecasts. Participants indicated their cost
target amount using a scale ranging from $200,000 to $600,000. For each of these three
questions, the forecast is subtracted from the participant’s indicated production cost target to
obtain a measure of budgetary slack.
Pilot testing
A pilot test was conducted at a public university. The objective of pilot testing is to
ensure the clarity and effectiveness of the instrument in capturing the required responses from
the participants. In addition, a pilot test allows for a preliminary evaluation for the manipulations
used on the instrument.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULT AND ANALYSIS

Participants and Sample Size
The participants for this experiment consist of 162 graduate business students from a
public university in United States. Twenty-eight participants did not pass the manipulation check
and were eliminated from the analyses. Thus, the final sample size for this study is 134
participants. The mean grade-point average (GPA) is 3.36 out of 4.00. In addition, the majority
of the participants were MBA students (59 percent) while the remaining participants were
enrolled in other graduate programs such as Master of Accounting, Master of Science in Global
Marketing, Finance, Information System, and Business Analytics.
Demographic Data
Eighty-five participants (63.4 percent) are male and 49 participants (36.6 percent) are
female. Participants’ average age is 27 years (range of 21 to 63 years). The majority (74 percent)
of the participants self report that they are currently employed, and the mean professional
employment experience is 5.22 years. Additionally, 42 percent of participants claimed to have
been involved in the budgeting process during their professional employment. Moreover,
participants indicated their agreement to the statement that it is unethical to intentionally
misreport a production cost target or to create budget slack (mean response of 7.69 on a 10 point
of scale). Demographic data and correlations of the variables on the sample are summarized in
Table 1 and 2, respectively.
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here]
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Manipulation and Understanding Checks
Manipulation Checks
The objective of manipulation checks in an instrument is to assure that the participants
understand the task and/or the experimental manipulations. The manipulation check section for
this experiment consisted of questions regarding the assigned treatments. The first manipulation
check question related to the horizontal equity treatment (equal or unequal). Specifically,
participants were asked to identify their bonus rate based on the case that they just read. From the
total sample, 80 and 82 participants were assigned to the equal and unequal treatments,
respectively. Five participants from the unequal treatment and three participants from the equal
treatment answered this manipulation check incorrectly. To further verify the effectiveness of the
horizontal equality manipulation, participants were also asked whether they agreed with the
following statement: “the compensation structure among the production manager is fair.” They
responded using a 10-point Likert scale, where 0 indicates that they “strongly disagree”, 5
indicates that they are “neutral”, and 10 indicates that they “strongly agree”. For participants
assigned to the unequal treatment, the anticipated response is disagreement (i.e., a scale response
from 0 to 4) due to their receipt of a lower bonus rate than their peer. Among the 82 participants
assigned to the unequal treatment, 61 indicate their response correctly, and nine respond as
neutral (Mean = 2.40, Std. Deviation = 2.512).
The last question in the manipulation check section related to the manipulation of self
efficacy (low or high). Based on the task, participants were asked to choose a statement that
accurately reflects their ability as production manager as described in the experimental
instrument. Seventy-three and 89 participants were assigned to high and low self efficacy
treatments, respectively. In the high self efficacy treatment, four participants failed the
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manipulation check. A higher rate of failure was observed in the low self efficacy treatment with
18 out of 89 participants responding incorrectly. The frequency of failure under high and low
self efficacy is significantly different (Pearson Chi Square = 7.43, p = 0.006). This higher rate of
failure in the low self efficacy treatment is of interest. Low self efficacy is manipulated in the
instrument by indicating that the individual had poor prior performance. Participants receive
information regarding a prior inability to set the cost target accurately indicating that their skills
as production manager are questionable. One plausible explanation for the higher level of
manipulation check failure for this treatment is attribution theory7. The theory predicts that
individuals tend to associate negative outcome to external causes or refuse to assign internal
attribution to negative performance. Aligned with the theory, Xu and Tuttle (2005) document the
association between poor accounting performance and external attributions. Thus, consistent
with attribution theory, it is difficult for participants to internalize low self efficacy information.
The poor prior performance information may conflict with participants’ existing self-beliefs
about their ability. Therefore, by filtering the sample based on the passing of manipulation
checks criteria, the study assures that the analyses are derived from participants that understood
the task and internalized the experimental treatments.
The 27 participants who incorrectly answered one or both of the manipulation check
questions were eliminated from the sample. In addition, one participant who did not respond to
the manipulation checks section was also excluded from further analyses. Thus, 134 participant

7

This theory is first proposed by Heider in 1958. Attribution Theory suggests that individuals perceived, gathered,
examined, and combined information in order to be able to create a causal judgment for an event (Fisher and Taylor,
1991). Heider (1958) proposed that in the process of understanding the reasons that caused a behavior, individuals
use either internal or external attributions. Internal attributions refer to attitude, character, or personality traits. While
external attributions relate to situation or environmental conditions.
Heider (1958) further argues that individuals tend to explain the behavior of others using internal attributions (e.g.
personality traits). In other hand, individuals tend to explain their own behavior using external attributions (e.g.
situational or environment).
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responses are used for the analyses8. The demographic statistics for the 134 participants passing
the manipulation checks are approximately identical to those of the full sample including
participants who failed the manipulation checks.
Understanding Checks
The instrument contains two questions that test whether participants understand the case
and the task assigned. The first question asked participants to indicate the accuracy of the
forecast systems. Ninety percent of participants answered this question correctly. Another
question elicits information regarding participants’ understanding that the budgeting process
described in the case results in a slack inducing setting. Specifically, participants were asked to
indicate their agreement to the following statement: “My bonus will increase if my production
cost target is higher than actual production cost.” They responded using a 10-point Likert scale,
where 0 indicates that they “strongly disagree”, 5 indicates that they are “neutral”, and 10
indicates that they “strongly agree”. The correct answer for this question, regardless of treatment,
is agreement (i.e., a response of 6 to 10 on the scale). Out of 134 participants, 104 provided a
correct response, 8 submitted neutral as their response, and 22 answered incorrectly by providing
a scale response below 5. Overall, these responses suggest that the participants understand the
case and the task required in the experiment.
Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variables
Table 2 displays the correlation among the dependent variables. The likelihood to deviate
from forecast or the intention to create budget slack is significantly positively correlated with the
numerical budget slack created in all opportunity. Table 3 summarizes the cell means for the

8

The hypotheses tests are repeated using the full sample (n = 162). The findings are consistent as those from the
analysis using subset of sample of participants who passed the manipulation check (n = 134).
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dependent variables of interest, the likelihood of forecast deviation and point estimates of slack
creation in response to specific forecasts providing high, medium, and low opportunity for slack
creation. Panel A displays the cell means for the likelihood of deviation from the forecast. The
mean deviation likelihood is higher for the horizontal equity treatment as compared to horizontal
inequity treatment (Mean = 6.79 vs. 6.74, t = -0.161, two-tailed p value = 0.872). This pattern of
mean differences is inconsistent with Hypothesis 1. The mean deviation likelihood is higher for
the low self efficacy treatment than the high self efficacy treatment (Mean = 6.82 vs. 6.70, t =
0.387, two-tailed p value = 0.699). Although this difference is statistically insignificant, this
pattern of means provides initial support for Hypothesis 2, which predicts that individuals with
good prior performance will create less budgetary slack than those with poor prior performance.
Panel B of Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the second set of dependent
variables – the point estimates of slack creation in response to specific forecasts providing high,
medium, and low opportunity for slack creation.9 The mean slack creation for the horizontal
equity treatment is $94.02 (Std. Deviation = 85.49) when there is high opportunity, $60.00 (Std.
Deviation = 58.34) when there is medium opportunity, and -$1.06 (Std. Deviation = 45.20) when
there is low opportunity. The mean slack creation for the horizontal inequity treatment is $90.96
(Std. Deviation = 79.92) when there is high opportunity, $55.22 (Std. Deviation = 70.76) when
there is medium opportunity, and -$3.90 (Std. Deviation = 66.26) when there is low opportunity.
However, none of these mean differences are significant. The two tailed p values under high,
medium, and low opportunity are 0.831, 0.671, and 0.773, respectively. These means indicate
that the mean slack creation was higher under horizontal equity than under horizontal inequity
treatment for all opportunity levels. This is not consistent with Hypothesis 1, which predicts that
higher slack will be created under horizontal inequity than under horizontal equity.
9

The unit measurement for the numerical slack is in thousands of dollars.
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Consistent with Hypothesis 2, there is higher mean slack creation across opportunity
levels under the low self efficacy treatment than under the high self efficacy treatment. The mean
slack created in the low self efficacy treatment is $94.63 (Std. Deviation = 84.40) when there is
high opportunity, $58.97 (Std. Deviation = 61.94) when there is medium opportunity, and $1.84
(Std. Deviation = 38.95) when there is low opportunity. The mean slack created in the high self
efficacy treatment is $90.23 (Std. Deviation = 80.90) when there is high opportunity, $56.14
(Std. Deviation = 67.94) when there is medium opportunity, and -$6.97 (Std. Deviation = 70.50)
when there is low opportunity. However, none of the mean differences in slack creation between
high and low self efficacy are statistically significant (p-values for high, medium, and low
opportunity are 0.758, 0.801, and 0.370, respectively).
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Measure of Ethical Position
Ethical Position is measured using Forsyth’s Ethical Positions Questionnaire (EPQ). The
EPQ is comprised of two sets of 10 statements to measure idealism and relativism. Participants
provided their responses to the EPQ statements on a 9-point Likert scale where 1 represents
“completely agree” and 9 represents “completely disagree”. The Cronbach’s Alpha for the
idealism and relativism scales are 0.866 and 0.823, respectively.
Idealism and relativism scores are calculated based on the average of the responses to
each of the sets of 10 statements. Two participants were eliminated from the ethical positions
analyses due to incomplete responses to the EPQ. The overall mean and median idealism scores
are 6.14 and 6.30, respectively. For relativism, overall mean and median scores are 5.11 and
5.00, respectively. Further, participants are classified as having high or low idealism and
relativism using median scores as cut-off points (Bartnett et al., 1994; Elias, 2002; Forsyth and
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Nye, 1990). This results in 68 participants classified as low idealists and 64 participants
classified as high idealists. Coincidently, there are also 68 participants that classified as low
relativists and 64 participants classified as high relativists.
Potential Covariates
Demographic variables (such as age, class level, GPA, gender, employment status, years
of professional employment experience, and experience in budgeting setting), risk preference,
and perceptions of budget slack creation were evaluated as potential covariates. The evaluation
consisted of analyzing the association of the potential variables to the dependent variables. The
negative Pearson correlation of 0.217 between gender and the likelihood of forecast deviation is
significant with a two-tailed p-value = 0.01. The analyses also suggest significant correlation
between gender and slack creation under high and medium opportunity (Pearson correlation of 0.262 and -0.188, respectively) with a two-tailed p-value ≤ 0.05. Because of this significant
association, gender is included as a covariate in hypothesis testing. Table 2 summarized the
correlations among the dependent variables and the potential covariates.
Tests of Hypotheses
The analyses use the likelihood to deviate from forecast and point estimates of slack
creation in response to specific forecasts as dependent variables. Horizontal equity and self
efficacy are independent variables with gender as a potential covariate. General Linear Model
analysis is employed to test the main effects of horizontal equity (Hypothesis 1), self efficacy
(Hypothesis 2), and their interaction effect (Hypothesis 3) on budgetary slack creation. First, an
analysis of covariance ANCOVA is used to test the effect of the independent variables on the
first dependent variable measure, participants’ general likelihood of deviating from the forecast
while controlling for gender. Next, repeated measures ANCOVA is used to analyze participants’
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responses to the three specific forecasts. The repeated dependent variable is the three calculated
point estimates of budgetary slack obtained from participants’ responses to the three specific
forecasts.
Hypothesis 4 and 5 predict the association of ethical position on slack creation. Mean
analysis and correlation tests are conducted to test these hypotheses. Following Hastings and
Finegan (2011), hierarchical regression analyses were employed to analyze the interactions
among ethical positions and horizontal equity, and self efficacy.
Likelihood of Forecast Deviation
Panel A of Table 4 presents the results of the ANCOVA used to test the effect of the
independent variables on participants’ likelihood of deviating from the forecast, while
controlling for gender. The ANCOVA results indicate that gender is a statistically significant
covariate (p = 0.008). The results indicate no significant main effects for horizontal equity (p =
0.836) or self efficacy (p = 0.859) on the likelihood to deviate from the forecast. However, the
results indicate a marginally significant interaction between horizontal equity and self efficacy (p
= 0.078), which is consistent with Hypothesis 3. Specifically, under horizontal inequity, the
likelihood of deviating from the forecast is greater when self efficacy is high than when self
efficacy is low. The opposite pattern emerges under horizontal equity, such that the likelihood of
deviating from the forecast is lower when self efficacy is high than when self efficacy is low.
The significance of the interaction between horizontal equity and self efficacy may suppress the
individual main effects of the independent variables.
A minority of the experimental participants (25 out of 134) indicated that they would
report a cost that was less than the forecast, resulting in the creation of negative slack. Such a
response would result in the receipt of less than adequate funds to cover the forecasted costs.
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Such a choice is inconsistent with preferences for wealth or accuracy from the perspective of the
incentive structure set up in the experimental design. Thus, similar to prior studies (e.g., Evans et
al. 2001), the analyses are also conducted with these observations excluded. Specifically, the
ANCOVA analysis was conducted using the subset of observations from the 109 participants
who report costs equal to the forecast or greater (i.e., participant who create zero or positive
budgetary slack). Panel B of Table 4 presents the results of this additional analysis. The overall
results are similar from the prior analysis. Gender is significant (p = 0.003), and the main effects
for the independent variables are not significant. However the statistical significance of the
interaction is stronger (p = 0.026).
[Insert Table 4 about here]
A simple main effect analysis of differences in the estimated marginal means was
performed to examine the reported significant interactions between horizontal equity and self
efficacy on the likelihood to deviate from the forecast. Table 5 displays the results from the
simple main effects analysis while Figure 2 illustrates the interactions of the estimated marginal
means. The level of self efficacy influenced the likelihood to deviate from the forecast when an
equal horizontal equity is presence (F = 1.898, p = 0.085). However, the influence of self
efficacy is not significant to the intention on slack creation under unequal horizontal equity (F =
1.286, p = 0.129). Therefore, participants with low self efficacy treatment shows a significantly
higher intention to create budget slack, as compare to those with high efficacy treatment, when
they receive equal horizontal equity. This result provides initial support for Hypothesis 2.
Horizontal equity influenced the likelihood to deviate from forecast under low self
efficacy treatment (F = 2.000, p = 0.080), but not under high self efficacy treatment (F = 1.220, p
= 0.135). Specifically, under high self efficacy, participants with unequal horizontal equity
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treatment indicate a higher intention to create budget slack, as compare to those with equal
horizontal equity. Although the pattern is consistent with the direction of the predicted
interaction on Hypothesis 3, however the mean difference is not statistically significant.
Panel B on Table 5 and Figure 2 displays the results of the simple main effects analysis
using subset of responses from participants who create a zero and or positive budgetary slack.
The level of self efficacy influenced the likelihood to deviate from the forecast under the
presence of unequal horizontal equity (F = 4.223, p = 0.021), but not under equal horizontal
equity (F = 1.314, p = 0.127). Specifically, participants with high self efficacy treatment show a
significantly higher intention to create budget slack, as compare to those with low efficacy
treatment, when they receive unequal horizontal equity.
Horizontal equity significantly influenced the likelihood to deviate from forecast under
high self efficacy (F = 3.197, p = 0.039) and low self efficacy treatment (F = 1.990, p = 0.081).
The means patterns are consistent with Hypothesis 3. As predicted, participants with unequal
horizontal equity treatment indicate a significantly higher intention to create budget slack, as
compare to those with equal horizontal equity, when they receive high self efficacy treatment.
Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is supported.
[Insert Table 5 and Figure 2 about here]
Repeated Measures Analysis of Slack Creation
Panel A of Table 6 presents the results of the repeated measures ANCOVA used to
analyze participants’ responses (n = 134) to the three specific forecasts while controlling for
gender. The results indicate that gender is a statistically significant covariate (p = 0.021), but
reveal no significant main effects of horizontal equity (p = 0.654) or self efficacy (p = 0.705) on
budgetary slack creation. The interaction term is also insignificant (p = 0.827). Moreover, Panel
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B of Table 6 summarized the results from the analysis using subset of responses from the 109
participants who report costs equal to the forecast or greater. The findings are consistent as the
prior analysis. Gender is a statistically significant covariate (p = 0.009). There is no significant
main effects from horizontal equity (p = 0.934), self efficacy (p = 0.782), nor significant
interaction terms from both variables (p = 0.480). Figure 3 illustrates this interaction.
Interestingly, the interaction plot from the analysis of subset of responses of participants who
create slack (see Panel B of Figure 3) is consistent to the significant interactions which found on
the intention to deviate from forecast (see Figure 2). Nevertheless, the results from the analysis
of the point estimates of slack creation do not support Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.
[Insert Table 6 and Figure 3 about here]
Ethical Position
Hypothesis 4 proposes that budgetary slack creation will decrease as idealism increases.
Hypothesis 5 predicts that slack creation will increase as relativism score is increases. To test
these hypotheses, I examine mean differences and correlation analyses between the dependent
variables of interest and the ethical position scores. The results provide partial support for
Hypothesis 4 and 5. The results for mean analysis and correlation between the dependent
variables and ethical position scores are summarized in Table 7, and the results of the
hierarchical regressions are reported in Tables 8, 9, and 10.
Mean and Correlation Analysis
As Panel A of Table 7 reports, the mean likelihood of deviating from the forecast is
significantly higher for participants with a low idealism compared to those with a high idealism
(Mean = 7.10 vs. 6.40, t = 2.184, p = 0.031). Consistent with Hypothesis 4, this suggests that
individuals with low idealism scores report higher intentions to create slack than high idealism
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individuals. In addition, the likelihood to deviate from the forecast is negatively correlated with
the idealism score (Pearson correlation of -0.186). Similar to the intention to create slack, the
numerical slack created under all opportunities is negatively correlated with the idealism score.
The pattern of mean point estimates of slack in response to the three forecasts is also consistent
with Hypothesis 4, especially under high and medium opportunity; however the mean
differences are not statistically significant.
As Panel B of Table 7 reports, the mean of likelihood of deviating from the forecast for
high relativists is higher than for low relativists. However this difference is not statistically
significant (Mean = 6.89 vs. 6.60, t = -0.872, p = 0.385). Consistent with Hypothesis 5, the
relativism score is significantly positively correlated with budgetary slack creation under high
and medium opportunity. Further, the mean analysis shows that high relativists create
significantly higher budgetary slack compared to low relativist under high opportunity (p =
0.025) and medium opportunity (p = 0.023). Thus, the mean patterns and the correlation analysis
provide preliminary support for Hypothesis 5.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Hierarchical Regression Analysis
The hierarchical regressions analyses include two independent variables (horizontal
equity and self efficacy), the dependent variables (the likelihood to deviate from forecast and
numerical budgetary slack created), ethical position (idealism and relativism), and gender as
covariate. The idealism and relativism variables used in the analysis are in the form of
categorical variables that classifies the observations to high or low idealism and relativism scores
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based on the median split (Bartnett et al., 1994; Elias, 2002; Forsyth and Nye, 1990)10. The first
step of the analysis entered gender as a covariate. The second step entered the variables of
interest, which are equity, efficacy and ethical positions. The remaining phases of the analysis
entered the two, three and four way interactions terms sequentially. Following Hastings and
Finegan (2011), higher-order effects were interpreted only if the addition of the variables is
significant to the amount of variance accounted for. In other words, the interpretation of the
result will be conducted if the change in R2 is significant. Table 8 summarizes the steps that were
taken in the hierarchical analysis.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis for Likelihood of Forecast Deviation
Table 9 reports the results of the hierarchical multiple regression analysis for the first
dependent variable of interest, the intention to deviate from the forecast. Based on the first step
analysis, the result suggest that males reported a higher intention to deviate from the forecast or
to create slack than females (β = -0.22, p = 0.01). Thus gender is a statistically significant (F (1,
130) = 6.77, p = 0.01) variable explaining five percent of variance in the intention to deviate
from the forecast. The introduction of horizontal equity, self efficacy, idealism, and relativism
explained an additional three percent of variance in the intention to create budget slack, after
controlling for gender (R2 Change = 0.03, F (4, 126) = 1.027, p = 0.396). The second model is
marginally significant (F = 2.177, p = 0.061). However, Leech, Barret, and Morgan, (2011, p.
125) warned that one cannot use this to interpret whether the second model is better than the
prior model. Leech et al. suggest that the second model can still be significant without its
advancing to a significant degree on the first model. The results from the second model shows
10

Additional hierarchical multiple regression analyses are conducted using idealism and relativism as continuous
variables as opposed to dichotomous variables. The findings are consistent with those from the analyses using
ethical position in the form of categorical variable.
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that idealism is a marginally significant (p = 0.073) predictor for the second model. However,
since the changes of R2 are not significant, one cannot conclude that idealism can be accounted
for significant variance over and above gender for the reported intention on slack creation. As
displayed in Table 9, there were no significant two, three, or four way interactions among
horizontal equity, self efficacy and ethical positions over the intention to create budgetary slack.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis for Numerical Estimates of Slack Creation
Table 10 displays the results of the hierarchical multiple regression analysis for the
numerical budgetary slack created under high, medium, and low opportunity. Based on the first
model of the analysis, gender significantly predicts the budgetary slack created under high
opportunity (β = -0.253, p = 0.003) and medium opportunity (β = -0.193, p = 0.027). However as
indicated by the R2, only six percent and three percent of the variance of slack created under high
and medium opportunity could be predicted by gender.
Further, the results from the second phase suggest that all the newly entered variables
(horizontal equity, self efficacy, and ethical position) are able to increase the R2; however none
of the changes in R2 are statistically significant. Nevertheless, the second model itself is
statistically significant, especially under high (p = 0.019) and medium (p = 0.066) opportunity.
In the second model, relativism appears to be a significant predictor of slack created under high
(p = 0.028) and medium (p = 0.025) opportunity. However, since the changes of R2 are not
significant under both conditions, then the analysis cannot reasonably determine that relativism
can account for significant variance over and above gender for the reported point estimates of
slack creation.
In the fourth model including the addition of three way interactions, the coefficient of the
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interaction among equity, idealism, and relativism is significant (p = 0.043) under the medium
opportunity condition. However, since the addition of the variables to the new model is not
significant, or the changes of R2 are not significant, then this study will not interpret this
interaction. Similar with the intention to deviate from the forecast variable, the analyses indicate
that there are no significant two, three, or four way interactions among horizontal equity, self
efficacy and ethical position.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
Additional Analyses
Gender Effect
The ANCOVA analyses in the prior discussion indicate that gender is a significant
covariate in predicting the likelihood of forecast deviation and numerical estimates of budgetary
slack. Table 11 presents mean dependent variable scores by gender. These means reveal that
males are consistently more likely to create slack than females. T-tests of mean differences
indicate that men report a significantly higher likelihood of forecast deviation in the direction of
slack creation than women (p = 0.012). In addition, males create significantly more slack than
females when there is a high opportunity (p = 0.033) and medium opportunity (p = 0.030).
[Insert Table 11 about here]
Likelihood of Forecast Deviation based on Peers’ Behavior
There are two exit questions in the instrument that asked for participants’ intention to
create budgetary slack given information about whether their peers would create slack. The first
question assumes that the peer always creates budget slack, while the second question assumes
that the peer never creates budget slack. The objective for these questions is to examine whether
participants’ intentions to create budgetary slack is altered given their peers’ decisions regarding
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slack creation. It is expected that additional information indicating that a horizontal peer always
(or never) creates budgetary slack will provide participants with additional justification to report
(or not to report) costs that result in slack creation. In addition, the associations between the
responses from these exit questions and the participants’ ethical positions were further analyzed.
The study examines the responses using repeated measure ANCOVA. Horizontal equity, self
efficacy, idealism, and relativism were analyzed as independent variables while holding gender
as a control variable. The results from the analysis are displayed in Table 12.
The results provide additional support for Hypotheses 4 and 5. Regardless of the
knowledge regarding the horizontal peer, the responses suggest that gender is a significant
covariate for the intention to deviate from forecast (p = 0.005). There are no significant main
effect of equity (p = 0.328) and efficacy (p = 0.785). Further, idealism (p = 0.012) and relativism
(p = 0.045) are significant predictors for the likelihood to deviate from the forecast regardless the
information regarding horizontal peer. The analysis reveal no significant interaction terms
between equity and efficacy (p = 0.821) nor between idealism and relativism (p = 0.754). Panel
B of Table 12 reported the similar results for the same analyses using a subset of observations
from participants that create budgetary slack (n = 109).
[Insert Table 12 about here]
Understanding Check – Sensitivity Analysis
The hypothesis testing above was repeated using subset of sample which excludes the 22
participants that fail the understanding check. This additional analysis is conducted to determine
the robustness of the results had the analyses were performed using responses from participants
that understand the case. Table 13 through 18 summarized the results of the sensitivity analysis.
Table 13 displays the results from ANCOVA analysis on the intention to slack creation from
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excluding participants that fail the understanding check (n= 112). The results reveal that gender
is significant (p = 0.045) and no main effect from horizontal equity (p = 0.624) and self efficacy
(p = 0.563). The significance of the interaction between horizontal equity and self efficacy is not
robust (p = 0.117). Panel B of Table 13 shows the result of the ANCOVA analysis using
responses from participants who correctly answer the understanding check and create a zero or
positive budget slack (n = 96). The analysis reveals that the results are consistent with those from
including the participants who failed the understanding checks. Gender is still significant
predictor for the likelihood to create budget slack (p = 0.022). No indication of main effects from
horizontal equity (p = 0.793) and self efficacy (p = 0.728). However, the interaction between
horizontal equity and self efficacy is significant (p = 0.065).
[Insert Table 13 about here]
Table 14 summarized the repeated measures ANCOVA analysis for the numerical budget
slack crated. The results indicate that gender is no longer significant (p = 0.208). The remaining
results are consistent to those from including participants regardless their answer to the
understanding checks (n = 112). The main effects from the horizontal equity (p = 0.727), and
self efficacy (p = 0.352), also the interaction from equity and efficacy (p = 0.766) are not
statistically significant. Whereas, Panel B of Table 14 reported the result from the participants
that decided to create budget slack (n = 96). The results are consistent to the findings displayed
on Table 6. Gender is significant at p value of 0.009. No indication of main effects of horizontal
equity (p = 0.934), self efficacy (p = 0.782), and interaction (p = 0.480) between equity and
efficacy on the numerical budget slack creation.
[Insert Table 14 about here]
Table 15 and 17 reported the results from the hierarchical regression analysis to examine
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the moderator effects from ethical position in the budgetary slack creation using responses from
participants that understand the case (n = 112). Whereas Table 16 and 18 summarized the same
analysis using responses from participants who decided to create budget slack (n = 96).
Gender is a significant predictor for intention to deviate from forecast on both analyses of
subset of participants that understands the case (p = 0.051) and who create budget slack (p =
0.03). As shown on Table 15, on the second model of the analysis, idealism is a marginally
significant predictor for the intention to create slack. However, this study would not interpret this
result further since the model itself is not significant (p = 0.152). Moreover, interpretable result is
presence on the analysis from the subset of participants that create budget slack (see Table 16).
The findings suggest that the second model is better than the first model (R2 Change = 0.091, p =
0.059). Therefore, idealism accounted for significant variance over and above the covariate
variable, which is gender, for the intention to create budgetary slack. In addition, as reported on
Table 17 and 18, gender is significant for the numerical budgetary slack created under high
opportunity on both analyses of subset of participants that understand the case (p = 0.046) and
who create budget slack (p = 0.074). Consistent with the prior analysis, there is no indication of
any significant interaction among the variables of interest across all analyses.
[Insert Table 15, 16, 17, and 18 about here]

55

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary and Discussion
A vast stream of accounting research suggests the importance of incorporating non
pecuniary preferences in the analyses of judgment and decision making process. This study
contributes to the literature by providing experimental evidence regarding the influence of
horizontal equity, self efficacy and ethical position on budgetary slack creation.
Four research questions were analyzed through a 2 x 2 experiment using graduate
students as participants. The first research question is whether managers’ decision to create
budgetary slack is influence by their horizontal equity preferences. This question is examined by
testing Hypothesis 1, which consistent with equity theory, predicts individuals who perceive
horizontal inequity will create more budgetary slack than those with horizontal equity.
Contradictory to Hypothesis 1, the mean for reported intention to create budgetary slack or the
likelihood to deviate from the forecast is higher for participants with equal horizontal equity
treatment than those with unequal horizontal equity treatment. In addition, the T-test suggests
that the mean difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.699). Further, a similar mean pattern
and insignificant mean differences are also present for the numerical budgetary slack created.
The ANCOVA and repeated measure ANCOVA analyses indicate an insignificant main effect of
horizontal equity on both the dependent variable of interest likelihood to deviate from the
forecast, and the numerical slack created. These results provide evidence that Hypothesis 1 is not
supported indicating no significant effect of horizontal equity on budgetary slack creation.
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The second research question purposes whether the decision in creating budgetary slack
is affected by managers’ self efficacy. As self efficacy theory suggests, this study expects that
individuals’ poor prior performance will contribute toward their belief that they do not have the
required ability to perform the task. Therefore, this will encourage them to create more slack
compared to individuals’ with good prior performance. The mean for likelihood to deviate from
the forecast is higher for individuals who received low self efficacy treatment than those with
high self efficacy treatment. However, the result from the T-test analysis suggests that the mean
difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.872). Further, the similar results emerge from
mean analyses for numerical slack created on high, medium, and low opportunity levels. The
averages of numerical slack created across all opportunity levels are higher under the low self
efficacy compare to high self efficacy treatment. The mean patterns provide an initial support for
Hypothesis 2. Nevertheless, none of the mean difference is statistically significant, perhaps
attributed to the low power of the test due to a small sample. The ANCOVA and repeated
measure ANCOVA analyses also suggest that the main effect of self efficacy on budgetary slack
creation is not statistically significant. Accordingly the analyses provide the evidence of self
efficacy alone does not significantly influence the decision to create budgetary slack, not
supporting Hypothesis 2.
The third research question examines the interaction between horizontal equity and
managers’ self efficacy on budgetary slack creation decisions. Results indicate that horizontal
equity and self efficacy interact to affect the likelihood of deviating from the forecast to create
slack as hypothesized. Specifically, under horizontal inequity, the likelihood of deviating from
the forecast is greater when self efficacy is high than when self efficacy is low. The opposite
pattern emerges under horizontal equity, such that the likelihood of deviating from the forecast is
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lower when self efficacy is high than when self efficacy is low. Conversely, the significant
interaction between horizontal equity and self efficacy is not presence on the analyses of
numerical estimations of slack creation. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported; specifically the
interaction of horizontal equity and self efficacy significantly influences the reported intention to
create budgetary slack.
The final research question relates to the influence of ethical position on the decision to
create budgetary slack. Hypothesis 4 predicts the negative association between idealism and
budgetary slack creation. Meanwhile, Hypothesis 5 predicts the positive association between
relativism and the decision to create slack. The means and correlation analyses provide
preliminary supports for both Hypothesis 4 and 5. The study then further examines the involving
interactions among ethical positions, horizontal equity, and self efficacy through Hierarchal
Multiple Regression analysis. The findings support Hypothesis 4 that idealism is a significant
predictor of the reported likelihood to deviate from forecast. Consistent with Douglas and Wier
(2000), the result suggest that there is a negative relation between idealism score and reported
intention to create slack. This finding is expected given the characteristics of relative idealist
would consider budgetary slack creation as an unethical act due to the negative consequences
from the decision.
Whereas for the relativism analysis, the results indicate that relativism is a significant
predictor for the numerical slack creation under the high and medium opportunity level11. The
results are aligned with Hypothesis 5 and consistent with Douglas and Wier (2000). Specifically,
the analysis suggests the positive relation between relativism and the numerical estimates of the
11

The study suspects that the probable reason of why the same result is not emerge under the low opportunity is due
to the hypothetical cost forecast is too close to the maximum amount of cost estimation. The available hypothetical
slack to be created under this setting is approximately $25,000 compared to the medium opportunity $200,000, and
the high opportunity $375,000. This setting might cause the study to ineffectively analyze the response for the
budget slack created.
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budgetary slack. Further, this study does not find any significant interactions among ethical
positions, horizontal equity, and self efficacy. In addition, the results from the additional analysis
reveal men are significantly more likely to create budgetary slack than women (p = 0.012).
Contributions and Implications
This study contributes to the literature for several reasons. First, the study examines how
social motives, such as perceived fairness and self efficacy, influence the decision to create
budgetary slack. The results reveal that the interaction between horizontal equity and self
efficacy significantly influence the intention to create budgetary slack. Prior research has
documented an association between budgetary slack and ethical position (Douglas and Wier,
2000). The second contribution of the current study seeks to add to our knowledge of this
association by examining ethical position as a moderator given the joint effects of horizontal
equity and self efficacy. Further, the present study answers calls for research investigating the
effects of social preferences on individuals’ judgment and decision making (Luft, 1997; Sprinkle,
2003) and research on participative budgeting settings examining factors related to multiple
subordinate settings (Brink, Coats, and Rankin, 2012).
The implications of the findings are of interest to practitioners and stakeholders of
organizations for numerous reasons. First, the results of this study provide information regarding
the extent to which individuals are willing to sacrifice wealth due to non-pecuniary motives such
as preferences for horizontal equity. Second, this study examines the unintended consequences of
prior performance feedback. The results reveal that such feedback can define perceptions of self
efficacy, which may lead to a higher propensity for unethical behavior.
Limitations
This study is subject to the limitations derived from the consequences of experimental
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research. Although experimental research controls extraneous factors in its analyses, it is limited
by the generalizability of the results. The study uses a hypothetical case where the information
regarding peers’ compensation is available and known for the participants. This setting might not
be generally applicable in real practice. Furthermore, the results from this study need to be
carefully interpreted due to the use of graduate students as a sample and to the specific
characteristics of the task.
Another possible limitation is the fact that the experiment did not involved monetary
compensation for the participants. It is noteworthy that the study found significant interaction
between horizontal equity and self efficacy on the intention to create budget slack. However, this
result may possibly differ if the experiment involved economic incentives that relates to the
participants’ decision to creating budgetary slack.
Future Research
Several avenues for future research are available from this study. This study manipulates
the horizontal equity through the fairness of the compensation system. An interesting research
area is to examine whether the influence of horizontal equity to individuals’ decision will be the
same if the manipulation of the treatment is using the fairness of non-monetary reward such as
social recognition.
The current study exclusively examines the unequal horizontal equity in that the
inequality created disadvantageous situation for the participants when compensation system of
the peers is better than the individuals. Equity theory (Adams, 1963) proposes the negative state
from the inequality is also present under the condition where the inequality is advantageous to
the individual, such as when the individuals have better compensation than their peers. As
suggested by Matuszewski (2010), future research could further examine whether the
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advantageous inequality will have the same impact to the decision on budgetary slack creation as
disadvantageous inequality.
Finally, following Whyte et al. (1997), this study manipulates self efficacy through
hypothetical information regarding participants’ prior performances, rather than directly measure
participants’ self efficacy level. Bandura (1982) states that ones’ own mastery experience is the
most effective source of information in developing efficacy perceptions. Therefore, future
research should consider a laboratory setting that directly measures individuals’ self efficacy
through task performance.
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CASE INSTRUMENT

ABC Inc. produces edible crayons especially made for toddlers through two product lines, the
Red Line and the Green Line. Each product line is led by a production manager. Assume you are
the production manager for ABC’s Red product line.
One of your tasks is to set the production cost target for each production period. The production
cost target is reported to the company. Based on the cost target you report, the company transfers
funds to your product line at the beginning of each period to cover expected costs. In other
words, the funds you receive each period to run your product line will be equal to the production
cost target you report.
At the end of the period, the actual production costs can be calculated. Actual costs can range
from $200,000 to $600,000 and are not related to the costs of other product lines or to other
periods. The company has hired you with the expectation that you will set the production
cost target that is equal to your best estimate of the actual cost.
If the production cost target is set too low, the company will transfer insufficient funds to your
division, and you will not have enough cash available to complete production without delays.
Delayed production is extremely costly for the company, so they strongly discourage production
line managers from setting a production cost target that is too low.
If the production cost target is set too high, the company will transfer an unnecessarily large
amount of funds to your division. This will unnecessarily tie up funds with your division that
could be used more productively for other business operations. Thus, it is in the company’s best
interest for you to set your production cost target as accurately as possible.
Your Forecasting System:
You have a computerized forecasting system in place that uses select data to generate a private
forecast of the actual costs for the period. As manager, you can use the forecast along with your
personal experience and expertise to develop your production cost target.
Historically, the raw forecast generated by the system predicts actual production costs with
75% accuracy. In other words, there is a 75% chance that the actual costs will be equal to the
forecast, and a 25% chance that the actual costs will be different than the forecast. For example,
if the forecast is $400,000, then there is 75% chance that the actual costs will be $400,000, and a
25% chance that the actual costs will be different than $400,000.
The forecast you receive is private information that is not reported to the company. Thus, the
company will never know what your private forecast predicted. The company only knows that
the actual production costs will be between $200,000 and $600,000. Therefore, you can decide
whether to submit a production cost target that is equal to the forecast, or you can use your
personal skill and expertise to develop a production cost target that is higher or lower than the
forecast.
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Your Prior Performance:
Reporting an accurate cost target is not an easy task for production managers as it requires them
to have extensive knowledge regarding their production line. In addition, a manager must also
have the appropriate skills and abilities to effectively incorporate personal knowledge and
information to determine what cost target is most likely to be accurate.
High self-efficacy treatment:
Despite the difficulties of reporting accurate cost targets, you have established an excellent
record for working efficiently and reporting accurate cost targets. Your prior performance in
setting accurate cost targets is derived from your exceptional ability as a production manager.
This obviously indicates that you have mastered the skills and the knowledge required to
effectively and successfully manage your production line.
Low self-efficacy treatment:
You have not established a record for working efficiently and reporting accurate production cost
targets. Your poor prior performance in setting accurate cost targets makes it questionable
whether your skills and knowledge are sufficient to effectively and successfully manage your
production line.
Compensation system:
You and the manager of the Green line have the same gender, job description, years of
experience with the company, and perform the same tasks with the same workload. ABC
provides a bonus to each of you based on cost savings. Cost savings are defined as the targeted
production costs less the actual production costs for each production line. Your total
compensation consists of a fixed salary plus the bonus based on cost savings.
Horizontal equity treatment:
Your bonus rate is the same as your peer’s bonus rate. Specifically, your bonus rate is
50%, and the manager of Green Line also has a bonus rate of 50%. Each of you will
compute your bonus based on the following formula:
Bonus = 50% (production cost target – actual production costs)
The following examples illustrate the computation of your bonuses:
Example 1:

Assume a submitted production cost target of $400,000 and actual costs of
$300,000. Based on these numbers,
YOUR Bonus = 50% ($400,000-$300,000) = $50,000
Your PEER’s Bonus = 50% ($400,000-$300,000) = $50,000

Example 2:

Assume a submitted production cost target of $300,000 and actual costs of
$300,000. Based on these numbers,
YOUR Bonus = 50% ($300,000-$300,000) = $0
Your PEER’s Bonus = $50% ($300,000-$300,000) = $0
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To make sure you understand, please calculate the bonuses for the third example below before
continuing (raise your hand if you need assistance with this calculation):
Example 3:

Assume a submitted production cost target of $500,000 and actual costs of
$300,000. Based on these numbers,
YOUR Bonus = _________________________________?
Your PEER’s Bonus = _________________________________?

Horizontal inequity treatment:
Your bonus rate is different than your peer’s bonus rate. Specifically, your bonus rate is
50%, whereas the manager of Green line has a bonus rate of 95%. Each of you will compute
your bonus based on the following formulas:
YOUR Bonus = Fixed Salary + 50% (production cost target – actual production costs)
Your PEER’s Bonus = Fixed Salary + 95% (production cost target – actual production costs)
The following examples illustrate the computation of your bonuses:
Example 1:

Assume a submitted production cost target of $400,000 and actual costs of
$300,000. Based on these numbers,
YOUR Bonus = 50% ($400,000-$300,000) = $50,000
Your PEER’s Bonus = 95% ($400,000-$300,000) = $95,000

Example 2:

Assume a submitted production cost target of $300,000 and actual costs of
$300,000. Based on these numbers,
YOUR Bonus = 50% ($300,000-$300,000) = $0
Your PEER’s Bonus = 95% ($300,000-$300,000) = $0

To make sure you understand, please calculate the bonuses for the third example below before
continuing (raise your hand if you need assistance with this calculation):
Example 3:

Assume a submitted production cost target of $500,000 and actual costs of
$300,000. Based on these numbers,
YOUR Bonus = _________________________________?
Your PEER’s Bonus = _________________________________?
Summary:
Your job is to set the production cost target for the period.
Actual product costs will be between $200,000 and $600,000.
You will receive a private forecast of the estimated actual costs, which is 75% accurate.
The company expects you to set your production cost target as accurately as possible.
Reporting a cost target that is too high or too low will jeopardize company’s best interests.
Your bonus is based on the difference between your reported production cost target and actual
costs.
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Part I
1. On the scale below please indicate the number that best represents the likelihood that you
would report a cost target that is different than your private forecast.
Extremely
likely to report
a targeted
production
cost that is less
than the
forecast

[_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____]
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Most likely to
report a targeted
production cost
that is equal to
the forecast

Extremely
likely to report a
targeted
production cost
that is higher
than the
forecast

2. Assume that you receive a production cost forecast of $225,000. Please mark the scale below
to indicate the amount that you will submit for your cost target (in thousands). You may
place your mark anywhere on the scale.
Forecast:
$225

|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
$200

$250

$300

$350

$400

$450

$500

$550

$600

3. Assume that you receive a production cost forecast of $400,000. Please mark the scale
below to indicate the amount that you will submit for your cost target (in thousands). You
may place your mark anywhere on the scale.
Forecast:
$400

|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
$200

$250

$300

$350

$400

$450

$500

$550

$600

4. Assume that you receive a production cost forecast of $575,000. Please mark the scale below
to indicate the amount that you will submit for your cost target (in thousands). You may
place your mark anywhere on the scale.
Forecast:
$575

|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
$200

$250

$300

$350

$400
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$450

$500

$550

$600

Part II:
1. For the case that you just read, your bonus rate was (check one):
_____ less than your peer’s bonus rate
_____ equal to your peer’s bonus rate
2. For the case that you just read, based on the information given about your prior performance,
which of the following statements is more accurate? (check one)
_____ my prior performance indicates a lack of ability as production manager
_____ my prior performance indicates sufficient ability as production manager
3. Historically, how accurate is the private forecast? Please respond with a percentage between
0% and 100%.
_____ % accurate
Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements:
4. My bonus would increase if my production cost target is higher than actual production costs.
Strongly
Disagree [_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____]
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Strongly Agree

Neutral

5. It is unethical to intentionally misreport a production cost target.
Strongly
Disagree [_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____]
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Strongly Agree

Neutral

6. I found the compensation structure among the production managers to be fair.
Strongly
Disagree [_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____]
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Neutral
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Strongly Agree

7. Assume your peer, the production manager of Green line, discloses that he or she always
overstates his or her cost target. On the scale below please indicate the number that best
represents the likelihood that you would choose to overstate your cost target.
Extremely
Unlikely [_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____]
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Extremely
Likely

Neutral

8. Assume your peer, production manager of Green line, discloses that he or she never
overstates his or her cost target. On the scale below please indicate the number that best
represents the likelihood that you would choose to overstate your cost target.
Extremely
Unlikely [_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____]
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Extremely
Likely

Neutral

9. Assume that you must choose between two options. If you choose Option A, you will receive
$5 for certain. If you choose Option B, you will play a lottery where there is a chance you
will receive $10 and a chance you will receive $0.
For each choice below, indicate whether you would pick Option A or Option B:
Which Option would
you pick? Check one
box for each Choice.

Choice 1
Choice 2
Choice 3
Choice 4
Choice 5
Choice 6
Choice 7
Choice 8
Choice 9
Choice 10
Choice 11

Option A:
Certain Payment
$5
$5
$5
$5
$5
$5
$5
$5
$5
$5
$5

Option B:
Lottery
0% chance of $10; 100% chance of $0
10% chance of $10; 90% chance of $0
20% chance of $10; 80% chance of $0
30% chance of $10; 70% chance of $0
40% chance of $10; 60% chance of $0
50% chance of $10; 50% chance of $0
60% chance of $10; 40% chance of $0
70% chance of $10; 30% chance of $0
80% chance of $10; 20% chance of $0
90% chance of $10; 10% chance of $0
100% chance of $10; 0% chance of $0
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Option A

Option B

Please indicate if you agree or disagree with the following items. Each represents a commonly
held opinion and there are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your reaction to such
matters of opinion. Rate your reaction to each statement by checking the box that best reflects
your opinion.
Completely
Completely
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
1

2

People should make certain that their
actions never intentionally harm
another even to a small degree.
Risks to another should never be
tolerated, irrespective of how small the
risks might be.
The existence of potential harm to
others is always wrong, irrespective of
the benefits to be gained.
One should never psychologically or
physically harm another person.
One should not perform an action
which might in any way threaten the
dignity and welfare of another
individual.
If an action could harm an innocent
other, then it should not be done.
Deciding whether or not to perform an
act by balancing the positive
consequences of the act against the
negative consequences of the act is
immoral.
The dignity and welfare of the people
should be the most important concern
in any society.
It is never necessary to sacrifice the
welfare of others.
Moral behaviors are actions that
closely match ideals of the most
“perfect” action.
There are no ethical principles that are
so important that they should be a part
of any code of ethics.
What is ethical varies from one
situation and society to another.
Moral standards should be seen as
being individualistic; what one person
considers to be moral may be judged to
be immoral by another person.
Different types of morality cannot be
compared as to “rightness.”
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3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Completely
Disagree
1

Completely
Agree

Neutral

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Questions of what is ethical for
everyone can never be resolved since
what is moral or immoral is up to the
individual.
Moral standards are simply personal
rules that indicate how a person should
behave, and are not to be applied in
making judgments of others.
Ethical considerations in interpersonal
relations are so complex that
individuals should be allowed to
formulate their own individual codes.
Rigidly codifying an ethical position
that prevents certain types of actions
could stand in the way of better human
relations and adjustment.
No rule concerning lying can be
formulated; whether a lie is
permissible or not permissible totally
depends upon the situation.
Whether a lie is judged to be moral or
immoral depends upon the
circumstances surrounding the action.

Please answer a few final questions.
1. What is your current class level?  Masters of Accounting student  MBA student
 Other (Please specify):________________
2. What is your overall GPA (at the start of this semester)? _____________
3. What is your age? ________________
4. What is your gender?

 Male

 Female

5. Employment status:  Full-time  Part-time  Not currently employed
6. How many years of professional employment experience do you have: ____ years
7. Have you ever been involved in the budgeting process on your job?

 Yes

Please check that you have answered all the questions.
Thank you for participating!
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TABLE 1
Participants Demographic Information
Sample *

Full Sample

n = 134

n = 162

Mean
Std. Dev

27.6
6.16

27.39
5.85

Female
Male

36.60%
63.40%

35.40%
64.60%

59.40%
26.30%
14.30%

60.60%
24.40%
15.00%

3.36
0.91

3.31
0.92

Employment
Full Time
Part Time
Not Currently Employed

51.10%
23.30%
25.60%

50.00%
21.20%
28.80%

Years of professional experience
Mean
Std. Dev

5.22
5.91

4.93
5.65

Have you been involved in the budgeting process in your
job?

42%

39%

Is it unethical to intentionally create budget slack?
(1 to 10, where 10 = strongly agree)
Mean
Std. Dev

7.69
2.62

7.55
2.69

Age

Gender

Current Class Level
MBA
Master of Accounting
Other Graduate Programs
GPA
Mean
Std. Dev

* Participants who correctly answered the manipulation checks.
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TABLE 2
Pearson Correlations
1
1. Likelihood to deviate from the
forecasta
2. Slack created under High
Opportunityb
3. Slack created under Medium
Opportunityb
4. Slack created under Low
Opportunityb
5. Current class levelc
6. GPA
7. Age
8. Gender

d

9. Employment

2

10.Years of professional experience

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

.420**

1

.590**

.539**

1

.430**

.041

.615**

1

.147

-.050

.190*

.226**

1

-.035

-.145

.026

.104

.182*

1

.092

**

*

.028

.136

.101

1

*

.029

-.130

-.072

-.184*

1

.013

**

.145

.270

**

-.196*

1

.916

**

-.124

**

1

*

.235
-.262

**

.187
-.188

.069

.009

.068

.129

*

**

.069

.158

.053

.208

.231

.377

.332

11. Have you ever involved in the
budgeting process?f

.185*

.149

.228**

.115

.182*

-.009

.381**

-.178*

.212*

.491**

1

12. Creating a slack is unethical?g

.026

-.088

-.069

.049

-.055

.149

.027

.185*

-.110

.064

-.016

1

.038

-.015

.042

.057

-.026

.113

.013

-.133

-.013

.013

-.054

.022

13. Risk preference

h

13

1

-.217
e

3

a

The likelihood that participants would report a cost target that is different than the private forecast. Measured on an 11 point Likert scale where 0 = "Extremely likely to
report a targeted production cost that is less than the forecast", and 10 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost that is higher than the forecast".
b

Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) across three different hypothetical forecasted cost amount. First, when the forecasted cost is $225,000,
representing the high opportunity to maximize slack. Second, when the forecasted cost is $575,000, representing the low opportunity to maximize slack. Last, when the
forecasted cost is $575,000, representing the low opportunity to maximize slack.
c Where 2 = MBA Program, 1 = Master of Accountancy, 0 = Others
d Where 0 = Male, and 1 = Female
e Where 2 = Full Time, 1 = Part Time, 0 = Currently Unemployed
f Where 0 = No, and 1 = Yes
g

Measured on an 11 point Likert scale where 0 = "Strongly Disagree", 5 = " Neutral", and 10 = "Strongly Agree".

h

Level of risk averse. Measured using a series of questions related to investment decisions on low to high risk investment.

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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1

TABLE 3
Panel A: Means and Standard Deviation for the Likelihood to Deviate from Forecasta
High Self Efficacy
mean
S.D.

Low Self Efficacy
mean
S.D.

Total
mean
S.D.

Equal Horizontal Equity

6.47

1.48

7.09

1.85

6.79

1.70

Unequal Horizontal Equity

6.91
6.70

2.15
1.86

6.56
6.82

1.99
1.92

6.74
6.76

2.06
1.88

Total

Panel B: Means and Standard Deviation for Numerical Budgetary Slack
High Self Efficacy
mean
S.D.

Equal
Horizontal
Equity

Unequal
Horizontal
Equity

Total

Low Self Efficacy
mean
S.D.

Total
mean
S.D.

High Opportunityb
Medium
Opportunityc

89.69

79.02

98.09

92.17

94.02

85.49

57.34

62.41

62.50

55.05

60.00

58.34

Low Opportunityd

-2.19

50.48

0.00

40.36

-1.06

45.20

High Opportunityb
Medium
Opportunityc

90.74

83.81

91.18

77.09

90.96

79.92

55.00

73.69

55.44

68.80

55.22

70.76

d

Low Opportunity

-11.47

85.75

3.68

38.01

-3.90

66.26

High Opportunityb
Medium
Opportunityc

90.23

80.90

94.63

84.40

92.46

82.41

56.14

67.94

58.97

61.94

57.57

64.74

Low Opportunityd

-6.97

70.50

1.84

38.95

-2.50

56.68

Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal. Self Efficacy was
manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and poor prior performance.
a

The likelihood that participants would report a cost target that is different than the private forecast. Measured on
an 11 point Likert scale where 0 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost that is less than the
forecast", and 10 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost that is higher than the forecast".
b

Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) when the forecasted cost is $225,000,
representing the high opportunity to maximize slack.
c

Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) when the forecasted cost is $400,000,
representing the medium opportunity to maximize slack.
d

Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) when the forecasted cost is $575,000,
representing the low opportunity to maximize slack.
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TABLE 4
Results of ANCOVA of the Forecast Deviation Likelihooda
Panel A : Sampleb (n = 134)
Source
df
F
Horizontal Equity
Self Efficacy
Gender
Horizontal Equity*Self Efficacy
Error

p-value

1
1
1
1
129

0.043
0.032
7.266
3.154

0.836
0.859
0.008
0.078

df

F

p-value

1
1
1
1
104

0.074
0.392
9.335
5.089

0.786
0.533
0.003
0.026

Panel B : Slack Creationc (n = 109)
Source
Horizontal Equity
Self Efficacy
Gender
Horizontal Equity*Self Efficacy
Error

Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal.
Self Efficacy was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and
poor prior performance.
a

The likelihood that participants would report a cost target that is different than the private
forecast. Measured on an 11 point Likert scale where 0 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted
production cost that is less than the forecast", and 10 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted
production cost that is higher than the forecast".
b

Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks

c

Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks and create a zero and or positive budgetary
slack
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TABLE 5
Estimated Marginal Means and Tests of Simple Main Effects for Forecast Deviation
Likelihooda
Panel A : Estimated Marginal Means (Std. Error) for Sampleb (n = 134)
Test of Simple
High Efficacy
Low Efficacy
Effects
Equal Horizontal Equity
Unequal Horizontal Equity
Test of Simple Effects

6.477 (0.326)
n = 32
6.980 ( 0.317)
n = 34
F = 1.220
p = 0.135

7.103 (0.316)
n = 34
6.468 (0.318)
n = 34
F = 2.000
p = 0.080

F = 1.898
p = 0.085
F = 1.286
p = 0.129

Panel B : Estimated Marginal Means (Std. Error) for Slack Creationc (n = 109)
Test of Simple
High Efficacy
Low Efficacy
Effects
Equal Horizontal Equity
Unequal Horizontal Equity
Test of Simple Effects

6.663 (0.346)
n = 26
7.524 (0.335)
n = 28
F = 3.197
p = 0.039

7.219 (0.340)
n = 27
6.542 (0.336)
n = 28
F = 1.990
p = 0.081

F = 1.314
p = 0.127
F = 4.223
p = 0.021

Notes: Each F tests the simple effects of one manipulated variable within the level of the other
manipulated variable. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among
the estimated marginal means. The covariate appearing in the model, Gender, is evaluated at 0.37 on
Panel A and at 0.38 on Panel B.
Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal. Self Efficacy
was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and poor prior performance.
a

The likelihood that participants would report a cost target that is different than the private forecast.
Measured on an 11 point Likert scale where 0 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost
that is less than the forecast", and 10 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost that is
higher than the forecast".
b

Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks

c

Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks and create a zero and or positive budgetary slack
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TABLE 6
Results of Repeated Measures Mixed ANCOVA of Slack Creationa
Panel A : Sampleb (n = 134)
Source
Horizontal Equity
Self Efficacy
Gender
Horizontal Equity*Self Efficacy
Error
Panel B : Slack Creationc (n = 109)
Source
Horizontal Equity
Self Efficacy
Gender
Horizontal Equity*Self Efficacy
Error

df

F

p-value

1
1
1
1
129

0.201
0.143
5.471
0.048

0.654
0.705
0.021
0.827

df

F

p-value

1
1
1
1
104

0.007
0.077
7.050
0.502

0.934
0.782
0.009
0.480

Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal
and unequal. Self Efficacy was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good
prior performance and poor prior performance.
a

Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) across three
different hypothetical forecasted cost amount. First, when the forecasted cost is
$225,000, representing the high opportunity to maximize slack. Second, when the
forecasted cost is $575,000, representing the low opportunity to maximize slack.
Last, when the forecasted cost is $575,000, representing the low opportunity to
maximize slack.
b

Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks

c

Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks and create a zero and or positive
budgetary slack
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TABLE 7
Means and Correlations of Budgetary Slack Creation by Ethical Position
Panel A: Budgetary Slack Creation by Idealism

a

Deviation Likelihood
High Opportunityb

Medium Opportunityc
Low Opportunityd

Low Idealism
High Idealism
Low Idealism
High Idealism
Low Idealism
High Idealism
Low Idealism
High Idealism

t

p-value
(2-tailed)

Pearson
Correlation

2.184

0.031

-0.186*

0.659

0.511

-0.057

0.592

0.555

-0.51

45.06

-0.342

0.733

-0.03

S.D.

t

p-value
(2-tailed)

Pearson
Correlation

-0.872

0.385

0.076

-2.262

0.025

0.195*

-2.304

0.023

0.198*

0.01

0.992

-0.001

N

Mean

S.D.

68
64
68
64
68
64
68

7.10
6.40
97.03
87.62
60.80
54.15
-4.13

1.95
1.76
88.01
76.40
68.97
60.27
66.08

64

-0.77

Mean

Panel B: Budgetary Slack Creation by Relativism
N

a

Deviation Likelihood
High Opportunityb

Medium Opportunityc
Low Opportunityd

Low Relativism
High Relativism
Low Relativism
High Relativism
Low Relativism
High Relativism
Low Relativism
High Relativism

68 6.60
1.71
64 6.89
2.07
68 76.25 72.44
64 108.13 89.04
68 44.49 69.51
64 70.16 57.49
68 -2.86 60.22
64

-2.97

53.86

Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal. Self Efficacy was
manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and poor prior performance.
a

The likelihood that participants would report a cost target that is different than the private forecast. Measured on an 11
point Likert scale where 0 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost that is less than the forecast", and 10 =
"Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost that is higher than the forecast".
b

Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) when the forecasted cost is $225,000 , representing the
high opportunity to maximize slack.
c

Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) when the forecasted cost is $400,000, representing the
medium opportunity to maximize slack.
d

Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) when the forecasted cost is $575,000, representing the
low opportunity to maximize slack.
*

Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
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TABLE 8
Hierarchical Regression Analysis
Step
Step 1
Step 2

Variable(s) Entered
Covariate
Variables of Interest

Step 3

Two Way Interactions

Step 4

Three Way Interactions

Step 5

Four Way Interaction

Descriptions
Gender
EQ
EFF
ID
REL
EQ*ID
EQ*REL
EQ*EFF
EFF*ID
EFF*REL
ED*REL
EQ*EFF*ID
EQ*EFF*REL
EQ*ID*REL
EFF*ID*REL
EQ*EFF*ID*REL

Variable Definitions:
EQ = Horizontal Equity, manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and
unequal. This is a categorical variable where 0 = Unequal, and 1 = Equal.
EFF = Self Efficacy, manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior
performance and poor prior performance. This is a categorical variable where 0 = Low
Efficacy, and 1 = High Efficacy.
ID = Idealism, measured using Ethical Position Questionnaire (EPQ). The idealism
score is classified as: low or high based on the median split. This is a categorical
variable where 0 = Low Idealists, and 1 = High Idealists.
REL = Relativism, measured using Ethical Position Questionnaire (EPQ). The
relativism score is classified as: low or high based on the median split. This is a
categorical variable where 0 = Low Relativists, and 1 = High Relativists.
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TABLE 9
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Likelihood to Deviate from Forecast
Likelihood to Deviate from Forecast (β)
Step 1
Gender
-0.22**
R2
Step 2
EQ
EFF
ID
REL

0.05**
0.043
-0.049
-0.160*
0.059

R2

0.08*

∆ R2
Step 3
EQ*ID
EQ*REL
EQ*EFF
EFF*ID
EFF*REL
ID*REL

0.030
0.081
-0.057
-0.218
0.055
0.063
-0.054

R2

0.105

∆R
Step 4
EQ*EFF*ID
EQ*EFF*REL
EQ*ID*REL
EFF*ID*REL

-0.025
0.048
0.151
-0.345

R2

0.127

2

0.025

∆R
Step 5
EQ*EFF*ID*REL
2

0.220
0.184

2

R
∆ R2

0.129
0.020

Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal. Self
Efficacy was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and poor prior
performance.
** p≤ 0.01
* p≤ 0.10
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TABLE 10
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Budgetary Slack Creation
High
Medium
Opportunity
Opportunity
Low Opportunity
Step 1
Gender
-0.253***
-0.193**
0.028
R2
Step 2
EQ
EFF
ID
REL

0.064***

0.037**

0.001

0.047
0.001
0.017
0.189**

0.065
-0.018
-0.008
0.195**

0.030
-0.079
0.010
0.007

0.1**

0.078*

0.008

∆R
Step 3

0.037

0.041

0.008

EQ*ID

0.140

0.075

0.063

EQ*REL
EQ*EFF
EFF*ID
EFF*REL
ID*REL

0.143
-0.068
-0.073
0.079
0.150

0.000
-0.043
0.113
-0.009
0.081

-0.132
0.108
0.102
-0.092
-0.056

R2

0.127

0.088

0.029

0.026

0.010

0.020

0.081
-0.017
0.390
-0.013
0.151
0.024

0.169
0.311
0.467**
-0.181
0.137
0.049

0.192
0.101
0.293
-0.170
0.052
0.023

R2
2

∆R
Step 4
EQ*EFF*ID
EQ*EFF*REL
EQ*ID*REL
EFF*ID*REL
R2
∆ R2
Step 5
EQ*EFF*ID*REL
2

-0.168

-0.007

0.206

2

R

0.153

0.137

0.055

∆ R2

0.002

0.000

0.003

Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal. Self
Efficacy was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and poor prior
performance.
*** p≤ 0.01
** p≤ 0.05
* p ≤ 0.10
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TABLE 11
Budgetary Slack Creation Gender Effects
N Mean
S.D.
Deviation Likelihooda
High Opportunityb
Medium Opportunityc
Low Opportunityd

Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male

85
49
85
49
85
49
85

7.07
6.22
108.76
64.18
66.76
41.63
-3.76

Female

49

-0.31

t

p-value

2.554

0.012

3.113

0.002

2.195

0.03

50.564 -0.339

0.735

1.963
1.624
92.874
49.364
65.840
60.142
60.178

Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal. Self
Efficacy was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and poor prior
performance.
a

The likelihood that participants would report a cost target that is different than the private
forecast. Measured on an 11 point Likert scale where 0 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted
production cost that is less than the forecast", and 10 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted
production cost that is higher than the forecast".
b

Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) when the forecasted cost is
$225,000 , representing the low opportunity to maximize slack.
c

Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) when the forecasted cost is
$400,000, representing the medium opportunity to maximize slack.
d

Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) when the forecasted cost is
$575,000, representing the high opportunity to maximize slack.
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TABLE 12
Results of Repeated Measures Mixed ANCOVA of the Forecast Deviation
Likelihood given Peers' Behaviora
Panel A : Sampleb (n = 134)
Source
df
F
p-value
Horizontal Equity
Self Efficacy
Idealism
Relativism
Gender
Horizontal Equity*Self Efficacy
Idealism*Relativism
Error

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
123

0.963
0.075
6.436
4.114
8.079
0.052
0.099

0.328
0.785
0.012
0.045
0.005
0.821
0.754

df

F

p-value

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
98

0.460
0.024
5.371
4.188
5.964
0.050
0.183

0.499
0.878
0.023
0.043
0.016
0.824
0.670

Panel B : Slack Creationc (n = 109)
Source
Horizontal Equity
Self Efficacy
Idealism
Relativism
Gender
Horizontal Equity*Self Efficacy
Idealism*Relativism
Error

Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal.
Self Efficacy was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and
poor prior performance.
a

The likelihood that participants would report a cost target that is different than the private
forecast given horizontal peers always overstate and or never overstate. Measured on an 11
point Likert scale where 0 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost that is less
than the forecast", and 10 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted production cost that is
higher than the forecast".
b

Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks
Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks and create a zero and or positive budgetary
slack
c
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TABLE 13
Sensitivity Analysis
Results of ANCOVA of the Forecast Deviation Likelihooda
Panel A : Understands the Case b (n = 112)
Source
df
F
Horizontal Equity
Self Efficacy
Gender
Horizontal Equity*Self Efficacy
Error

p-value

1
1
1
1
107

0.242
0.337
4.110
2.497

0.624
0.563
0.045
0.117

Panel B : Slack Creationc (n = 96)
Source

df

F

p-value

Horizontal Equity
Self Efficacy
Gender
Horizontal Equity*Self Efficacy
Error

1
1
1
1
91

0.069
0.122
5.456
3.502

0.793
0.728
0.022
0.065

Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal.
Self Efficacy was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and
poor prior performance.
a

The likelihood that participants would report a cost target that is different than the private
forecast. Measured on an 11 point Likert scale where 0 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted
production cost that is less than the forecast", and 10 = "Extremely likely to report a targeted
production cost that is higher than the forecast".
b

Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks and Understanding Check

c

Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks, Understanding Check, and create a zero
and or positive budgetary slack
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TABLE 14
Sensitivity Analysis Results of Repeated Measures Mixed ANCOVA of Slack
Creationa
Panel A: Understand the Caseb (n = 112)
Source
df
F
p-value
Horizontal Equity
Self Efficacy
Gender
Horizontal Equity*Self Efficacy
Error
Panel B: Slack Creationc (n = 96)
Source
Horizontal Equity
Self Efficacy
Gender
Horizontal Equity*Self Efficacy
Error

1
1
1
1
107

0.123
0.873
1.605
0.089

0.727
0.352
0.208
0.766

df

F

p-value

1
1
1
1
91

0.004
0.000
3.521
0.586

0.949
0.994
0.064
0.446

Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and
unequal. Self Efficacy was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior
performance and poor prior performance.
a

Slack created (reported costs less forecasted cost in 000 dollars) across three different
hypothetical forecasted cost amount. First, when the forecasted cost is $225,000 ,
representing the high opportunity to maximize slack. Second, when the forecasted cost is
$575,000, representing the low opportunity to maximize slack. Last, when the forecasted
cost is $575,000, representing the low opportunity to maximize slack.
b

Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks and Understanding Check

c

Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks, Understanding Check, and create a zero
and or positive budgetary slack
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TABLE 15
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Likelihood to Deviate from
Forecast for Participants who Understand the Casea (n = 112)
Likelihood to Deviate from Forecast (β)
Step 1
Gender
-0.186*
R2
Step 2
EQ
EFF
ID
REL

0.035*
0.054
-0.063
-0.184*
0.036

R2

0.073

∆R
Step 3
EQ*ID
EQ*REL
EQ*EFF
EFF*ID
EFF*REL
ID*REL

-0.053
-0.135
-0.218
0.107
0.139
-0.094

R2

0.108

2

0.038

∆R
Step 4
EQ*EFF*ID
EQ*EFF*REL
EQ*ID*REL
EFF*ID*REL

-0.025
-0.033
0.163
-0.291

R2

0.123

2

0.035

∆R
Step 5
EQ*EFF*ID*REL
2

0.016
0.320

2

R

0.130

∆ R2

0.006

Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and
unequal. Self Efficacy was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior
performance and poor prior performance.
a

Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks and Understanding Check

* p≤ 0.10
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TABLE 16
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Likelihood to Deviate from Forecast
for Participants who Create Budget Slacka (n = 96)
Likelihood to Deviate from Forecast (β)
Step 1
Gender
-0.222**
R2
Step 2
EQ
EFF
ID
REL

0.049**
-0.014
0.023
-0.305***
-0.014

R2

0.141**

∆R
Step 3
EQ*ID
EQ*REL
EQ*EFF
EFF*ID
EFF*REL
ID*REL

0.091*

R2

0.175

2

0.020
-0.112
-0.224
0.004
0.152
-0.081

∆R
Step 4
EQ*EFF*ID
EQ*EFF*REL
EQ*ID*REL
EFF*ID*REL

-0.044
-0.030
0.080
-0.345

R2

0.192

∆ R2
Step 5
EQ*EFF*ID*REL

0.017

2

0.034

0.268

2

R

0.196

∆ R2

0.004

Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal. Self Efficacy was
manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and poor prior performance.
a
Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks, Understanding Check, and create a zero and or positive
budgetary slack
*** p≤ 0.01
** p≤ 0.05
* p≤ 0.10
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TABLE 17
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Budgetary Slack Creation
for Participants who Understand the Casea (n = 112)
High
Medium
Opportunity
Opportunity
Low Opportunity
Step 1
Gender
-0.190**
-0.099
0.061
R2
Step 2
EQ
EFF
ID
REL

0.036**

0.010

0.004

0.053
-0.009
0.001
0.160

0.056
-0.071
0.040
0.163

0.011
-0.127
0.135
0.032

R2

0.063

0.042

0.040

∆ R2
Step 3
EQ*ID
EQ*REL
EQ*EFF
EFF*ID
EFF*REL
ID*REL

0.026

0.032

0.036

0.086
0.139
-0.069
-0.109
0.100
0.138

-0.061
-0.024
-0.096
0.093
0.095
0.064

-0.102
-0.253
-0.001
0.196
0.073
-0.072

R2

0.088

0.052

0.079

∆R
Step 4
EQ*EFF*ID
EQ*EFF*REL
EQ*ID*REL
EFF*ID*REL

0.025

0.010

0.039

0.084
-0.102
0.454*
-0.027

0.159
3149.000
0.507**
-0.036

0.045
-0.182
0.190
0.083

R2

0.124

0.097

0.092

0.037

0.045

0.013

2

∆R
Step 5
EQ*EFF*ID*REL
2

-0.307

-0.206

0.085

2

R

0.130

0.100

0.092

∆ R2

0.006

0.003

0.000

Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal.
Self Efficacy was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and poor
prior performance.
a

Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks and Understanding Check

** p≤ 0.05
* p ≤ 0.10
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TABLE 18
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Budgetary Slack Creation
for Participants who Create Budget Slacka (n = 96)
High
Opportunity

Medium
Opportunity

Low Opportunity

-0.184*

-0.160

-0.026

R2
Step 2
EQ
EFF
ID
REL

0.034*

0.026

0.001

0.017
0.005
0.031
0.172

0.054
0.007
-0.115
0.122

-0.090
-0.015
-0.184
0.027

R2

0.063

0.058

0.046

∆ R2
Step 3
EQ*ID
EQ*REL
EQ*EFF
EFF*ID
EFF*REL
ID*REL
R2
∆ R2
Step 4
EQ*EFF*ID
EQ*EFF*REL
EQ*ID*REL
EFF*ID*REL

0.029

0.033

0.045

0.156
0.152
-0.154
-0.144
0.090
0.167
0.105
0.043

0.003
0.155
-0.053
-0.048
0.030
0.193
0.084
0.026

-0.311
-0.014
-0.104
0.496***
0.154
0.112
0.160
0.114

0.175
-0.057
0.592**
-0.112

-0.019
0.099
0.531**
-0.038

-0.009
0.000
0.147
0.183

0.167

0.130

0.169

Step 1
Gender

R2
∆R
Step 5
EQ*EFF*ID*REL

0.062

0.045

0.009

-0.493

-0.335

0.559

R2

0.181

0.136

0.187

0.014

0.007

0.018

2

∆R

2

Notes: Horizontal Equity was manipulated between subjects at two levels: equal and unequal. Self Efficacy
was manipulated between subjects at two levels: good prior performance and poor prior performance.
a
Participants that passes the Manipulation Checks, Understanding Check, and create a zero and or positive
budgetary slack
* p≤ 0.10
** p≤ 0.05
*** p≤ 0.01
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FIGURES
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FIGURE 1
Forsyth’s ethical ideologies.
Relativism
Idealism
High

High

Low

Situationist:
Rejects application of universal moral
principles. Believes that moral acts
have positive consequences for all
persons affected by an action or a
decision.

Absolutist:
Approves actions that result in
positive consequences for all
individuals. Also, believes that
actions should conform to absolute
moral principles.

Budgetary Slack Prediction:
Situationists will identify slack creation
as an unethical act due to the negative
outcomes of the act. However, as a
consequence of applying subjective
moral rules, situationists will decide to
engage in budgetary slack creation.

Budgetary Slack Prediction:
Absolutists apply universal moral
principles in analyzing slack creation
decisions as morally wrong. They
will also consider budgetary slack
creation as unethical since it will
produce negative outcomes for
others. Therefore, absolutists are
expected to create the least amount of
budgetary slack.

Subjectivist:
Rejects moral rules and believes that
moral decisions are subjective,
individualistic judgments. Believes that
negative consequences do not
necessarily make an action immoral.

Exceptionist:
Accepts moral rules in principle, but
is willing to violate moral rules in
order to circumvent negative
consequences. An action is not
condemned automatically because the
action involves negative outcomes for
others.

Budgetary Slack Prediction:
Subjectivists will not consider
budgetary slack creation to be unethical
because they will analyze each ethical
issue subjectively and ignore universal
moral principles. Therefore,
subjectivists will create the highest
amount of budgetary slack.

Budgetary Slack Prediction:
Although exceptionists adopt
universal moral principles, they will
be willing to apply alternative rules
and not condemn slack creation as
immoral due to its potential for
positive outcomes along with the
negative outcomes.

Low

Adapted from Forsyth (1980) and Bartnett et al. (1994).
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FIGURE 2
Interaction of Self efficacy and Horizontal Equity on Likelihood to Deviate
from Forecasta
Panel A: Sample (n = 134)
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Panel B : Slack Creation (n = 109)
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FIGURE 3
Interaction of Self efficacy and Horizontal Equity on Slack Creationa
Panel A: Sample (n = 134)
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Panel B : Slack Creation (n = 109)
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